供应商掺假行为的博弈分析与机制选择

供应商掺假行为会影响产品最终的质量与安全。本文研究由一个供应商和一个买方组成的分散式供应链,建立以买方为领导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,比较研究延期付款机制、检查机制与溯源机制对供应商掺假行为的影响。研究表明,检查机制与溯源机制无法完全阻止供应商的掺假行为,而延期付款机制可以实现对供应商掺假行为的完全遏制,其中生产掺假产品与非掺假产品的成本差是影响三种机制效率的重要因素。此外,增加买方产品责任成本可以有效降低供应商的掺假意愿,而供应商与买方的融资利率差会增加为防止供应商掺假行为的供应链成本,通过降低检查成本与溯源成本可以促使买方更好地遏制供应商的掺假行为。最后给出算例验证了上述结论,并进一步分析了各机制中不同参数对最优决策和利润的影响。

Game Analysis and Mechanism Choices of Supplier Product Adulteration Behavior

Supplier adulteration can affect the quality and safety of final product. This paper studies a decentralized supply chain with one supplier and one buyer and establishes a Stackelberg game model with a buyer as the leader. It compares the effect of three mechanism(deferred payment mechanism, inspection mechanism and traceability mechanism)on the supplier adulteration. Our analysis shows that the inspection mechanism and traceability mechanism cannot completely deter the suppliers from product adulteration, whereas the deferred payment mechanism can. Production costs difference between the adulterated and unadulterated product is the main factor influencing the three mechanisms. Furthermore, increasing the cost of the product liability can reduce the supplier's adulteration behavior effectively, while the financing rate differences between the buyer and supplier would increase the cost of supply chain of supplier to prevent adulteration. Buyers can reduce adulteration by decreasing inspection costs and traceability costs. Finally, the numerical examples are given to verify the above conclusions. We further analyze the influence of different parameters on the optimal decision and profit.