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考虑防御拓扑特征的暴恐事件演化博弈模型和仿真分析
引用本文:柴瑞瑞,刘德海,陈静锋,孙康. 考虑防御拓扑特征的暴恐事件演化博弈模型和仿真分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2017, 26(5): 28-36. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0105
作者姓名:柴瑞瑞  刘德海  陈静锋  孙康
作者单位:1.东北财经大学 管理科学与工程学院,辽宁 大连 116025;2.大连理工大学 系统工程研究所,辽宁 大连 116024;3.辽宁师范大学 海洋经济与可持续发展研究中心,辽宁 大连 116029
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71271045,71571033,71503033,71602021)
摘    要:暴恐分子有意避开政府机关、机场等关键设施的严密防御范围,选择早市、火车站卖票口等尚未得到有效防御的人群密集场所发动袭击。本文考虑政府反恐力量防御拓扑特征,即政府反恐力量防控范围与恐怖分子发动攻击范围之间相离、相切、相交和相含等拓扑关系,构建了暴恐事件的演化博弈模型,分析多种情景下均衡稳定性,在Netlogo平台下对多种情景的理论结果进行社会模拟分析。结果表明:政府和恐怖分子行为演化均衡策略与政府防控范围、恐怖分子发动攻击范围、政府防控成本、政府防控收益等多种因素有关,随着政府进行有效防控的范围不断增加,恐怖分子选择袭击的可能性将不断减小,直到采取不攻击策略。

关 键 词:恐怖主义  演化博弈  防御拓扑特征  仿真分析  演化稳定性  
收稿时间:2015-12-09

Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation Analysis of Terrorist Incidents Considering Defense Topological Characteristics
CHAI Rui-rui,LIU De-hai,CHEN Jing-feng,SUN Kang. Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation Analysis of Terrorist Incidents Considering Defense Topological Characteristics[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2017, 26(5): 28-36. DOI: 10.12005/orms.2017.0105
Authors:CHAI Rui-rui  LIU De-hai  CHEN Jing-feng  SUN Kang
Affiliation:1. School of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China; 2. Institute of Systems Engineering, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China; 3. Center for Studies of Marine Economy and Sustainable Development, Liaoning Normal University, Dalian 116029, China
Abstract:The terrorists intend to avoid government agencies, airports and other key facilities of the tight defense, and attack the morning fair, the book office in the train station and other crowded places, which are not yet effectively guarded. Considering topological characteristics of the government's defense, that is to say the topological relation between the scope of government control and the range of terrorist attacks, we construct the evolution game model of terrorist attacks and analyze the equilibrium stability of different situation. Moreover, we simulate theory results of various scenarios under the Netlogo platform. The results show that the simulation equilibrium strategies of government and terrorists are related to the range of government control, the range of terrorist attacks, the cost of government control and government prevention income and other factors. And with the increase of effective control of the government, the possibility of terrorist attacks will continue to decrease until a non attack strategy is adopted.
Keywords:evolutionary game  defense topological characteristics  simulation analysis  evolutionary stability  
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