中国电子废弃物押金返还政策决策模型及效应

应用博弈论研究了中国电子废弃物押金返还政策的决策模型及效应。研究表明,电子废弃物非正规回收环境成本较高时,社会福利最大化下的押金返还政策既能提高社会福利又能减少非正规回收数量;这时,只要押金返还额足够高,就可以使电子废弃物完全由正规回收者环保回收;合意的最小押金返还额取决于两类回收者单位电子废弃物处理利润:正规回收者处理利润越高、非正规回收者处理利润越低,合意的最小押金返还额越小;正规回收者单位电子废弃物处理利润越大、消费者对电子废弃物残值估计的最大值越小,社会福利越大。电子废弃物非正规回收环境成本较低时,不宜再使用社会福利最大化作为押金返还政策的决策目标。

Decision-Making Models and Effects of Deposit-RefundSystem for E-Waste in China

This paper applies game theory to a deposit-refund system for e-waste management in China, and analyzes the decision-making models and effects of the deposit-refund system. It shows that the deposit-refund system based on maximizing social welfare, under a higher environmental cost of informal recycling, can improve social welfare and reduce the amount of e-waste recycled informally. Simultaneously, e-waste would be completely recycled and properly disposed by formal recyclers if deposit-refund is high enough. It also shows that the desirable minimum deposit-refund varies with recyclers’ handling profits per e-waste, namely it decreases with the handling profit of a formal recycler and increases with the handling profit of an informal recycler. While social welfare increases with the handling profit of a formal recycler and decreases with the maximum salvage value of e-waste evaluated by consumers. Maximizing social welfare, however, would be no longer a suitable decision-making objective for the deposit-refund system when the environmental cost of informal recycling is lower.