Switching defence for switched systems under malicious attacks: A Stackelberg game approach |
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Affiliation: | 1. College of Information Science and Engineering, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China;2. Institute of Advanced Technology, Nanjing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Nanjing 210023, China |
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Abstract: | The security issue of switched systems is researched from a noncooperative dynamic game-theoretic perspective in this paper. A Stackelberg game is developed for the switched autonomous system suffering malicious attacks, and the Stackelberg equilibrium switching and attack strategies are constructed respectively. Afterwards, the proposed game-theoretic approach is extended to switched control systems. A Stackelberg Nash game is consequently established to characterize the hierarchical decision making processes, where the controller and the attacker are the followers who simultaneously make their own decisions, and a sufficient condition is provided for the construction of the Stackelberg Nash equilibrium. Finally, a continuous stirred tank reactor is exploited to validate the effectiveness and applicability of the proposed results. |
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Keywords: | Switched systems Game theory Cyber–physical system security |
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