具有同构产品市场竞争条件的两类企业市场进入及退出分析

本文研究两类企业在市场上进行竞争 ,生产量及企业数量达到均衡时市场进入与退出的问题 .假设市场上只有两类生产技术管理条件不同的企业 ,而一类企业的所有特性都相同 ,每个企业按最大利润组织生产 ,给定市场需求函数 ,可以建立起企业竞争的均衡模型 .通过变量替换 ,将均衡生产量及均衡利润表示为企业数量的函数 ,按利润不小于零为原则 ,可以构造出市场进入与退出的博弈模型 .本文还给出了企业市场进入与退出均衡状态判断的定理 ,并以一种线性需求函数与成本函数为特例 ,通过具体的演示 ,表述了模型解释客观现象的能力 .

The Game Model of Entrance to and Exit from Market Competition for Two Family of Companies with Homogenous Output

The market competition among two families of companies tends to the equilibrium of output and number of companies in entrance and exit. It assumes that the attributes of companies from one family are the same and two families of companies are concerned. The decision made by a company depends on its maximal profit. The equilibrium model is proposed with a elastic demand function so that the output can be determined. Hence, it is concerned with the map from output to profit and then to the number of companies. The game model of entrance and exit is therefore formulated. An equilibrium theorem isproved. An example is employed to illustrae its principle with linear function of demand and cost.