| 基于委托代理的工程监理激励——监督模型 |
| |
| 引用本文： | 朱林美,周晶,吴孝灵. 基于委托代理的工程监理激励——监督模型[J]. 运筹与管理, 2011, 20(3) |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 朱林美 周晶 吴孝灵 |
| |
| 作者单位： | 南京大学工程管理学院,江苏南京,210093 |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金，南京大学研究生科研创新基金 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 工程建设中,业主和监理之间的信息不对称往往会导致监理的道德风险问题,即监理的工作绩效会远远偏离业主的预定目标.为解决这一问题,本文通过引入监督成本和惩罚函数两个概念对传统的激励模型进行拓展,从而建立一个关于工程监理的激励监督模型,通过求解该模型,获得了业主的最优监督水平和相应的激励策略,并研究了业主如何在二者之间取得平衡.研究结果为业主对监理的有效管理提供了一种理论指导和实际方法.
|
| 关 键 词： | 委托代理 激励监督 道德风险 监督成本 |
The Incentive Supervise Model of Project Supervision Based on Principle-agent Theory |
| |
| ZHU Lin-mei,ZHOU Jing,WU Xiao-ling. The Incentive Supervise Model of Project Supervision Based on Principle-agent Theory[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2011, 20(3) |
| |
| Authors: | ZHU Lin-mei ZHOU Jing WU Xiao-ling |
| |
| Affiliation: | ZHU Lin-mei,ZHOU Jing,WU Xiao-ling(School of Management & Engineering,Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the incentive supervision model in the project management.Information asymmetry between the project owner and the supervising agent can easily cause some moral risks.The project owner can either stimulate or monitor agent's behavior.A principle-agent model is established in this paper to explain the monitor management in the project while the incentive pay form is applied.By introducing the concept about the supervision cost and punishment function,the paper finds the optimal solution of ... |
| |
| Keywords: | principle-agent theory incentive-supervision moral risk supervision cost |
| 本文献已被 CNKI 万方数据 等数据库收录！ |
|
