In Defense of Epistemic Circularity |
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Authors: | David Alexander |
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Institution: | (1) Iowa State University, 433 Catt Hall, Ames, IA 50011, USA |
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Abstract: | In this paper I defend epistemic circularity by arguing that the “No Self-Support” principle (NSS) is false. This principle,
ultimately due to Fumerton (1995), states that one cannot acquire a justified belief in the reliability of a source of belief by trusting that very source.
I argue that NSS has the skeptical consequence that the trustworthiness of all of our sources ultimately depends upon the
trustworthiness of certain fundamental sources – sources that we cannot justifiably believe to be reliable. This is a problem,
I claim, because if the trustworthiness of all of our sources depends upon sources that we should not believe to be reliable,
then a reflective individual should not trust any of his sources at all. The hidden cost of rejecting epistemic circularity
is thus the unacceptable skeptical thesis that reflective individuals like you and I have no justified beliefs whatsoever. |
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