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Coalitional games: Monotonicity and core
Authors:J. Arin  V. Feltkamp
Affiliation:a Dpto. Ftos. A. Económico I, University of the Basque Country, L. Agirre 83, 48015 Bilbao, Spain
b Maastricht School of Management, P.O. Box 1203, 6201 BE Maastricht, The Netherlands
Abstract:We characterize a monotonic core solution defined on the class of veto balanced games. We also discuss what restricted versions of monotonicity are possible when selecting core allocations. We introduce a family of monotonic core solutions for veto balanced games and we show that, in general, the per capita nucleolus is not monotonic.
Keywords:Monotonicity   Core   TU games   Per capita nucleolus
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