首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      


Suboptimality of M-step back strategies in Bayesian games
Authors:Dr S C Young  Dr J Q Smith
Institution:1. Statistics Section, Jealott's Hill Research Station, RG126EY, Bracknell, Berkshire, England
2. University of Warwick, Coventry, England
Abstract:We consider the Bayes optimal strategy for repeated two player games where moves are made simultaneously. In these games we look at models where one player assumes that the other player is employing a strategy depending only on the previousm-move pairs (as discussed in Wilson, 1986). We show that, under very unrestrictive conditions, such an assumption is not consistent with the assumption of rationality of one's opponent. Indeed, we show that by employing such a model a player is implicitly assuming that his opponent is not playing rationally,with probability one. We argue that, in the context of experimental games, thesem-step back models must be inferior to models which are consistent with the assumption that an opponent can be rational.
Keywords:
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号