A dynamic solution concept for abstract games

Several solution concepts have been defined for abstract games. Some of these are the core, due to Gillies and Shapley, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets, and the subsolutions due to Roth. These solution concepts are rather static in nature. In this paper, we propose a new solution concept for abstract games, called the dynamic solution, that reflects the dynamic aspects of negotiation among the players. Some properties of the dynamic solution are studied. Also, the dynamic solution of abstract games arising fromn-person cooperative games in characteristic function form is investigated.This research was supported by the Office of Naval Research under Contract No. N00014-75-C-0678, by the National Science Foundation under Grants Nos. MPS-75-02024 and MCS-77-03984 at Cornell University, by the United States Army under Contract No. DAAG-29-75-C-0024, and by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. MCS-75-17385-A01 at the University of Wisconsin. The author is grateful to Professor W. F. Lucas under whose guidance the research was conducted.