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水电工程施工标段间施工设备协作的合作对策模型
引用本文:周厚贵,戴志清,张开广,孙昌忠,曹生荣.水电工程施工标段间施工设备协作的合作对策模型[J].三峡大学学报(自然科学版),2014,36(5):6-9.
作者姓名:周厚贵  戴志清  张开广  孙昌忠  曹生荣
作者单位:1. 中国能源建设集团有限公司,北京,100029
2. 中国葛洲坝集团股份有限公司,湖北宜昌,443002
3. 水资源与水电工程科学国家重点实验室(武汉大学),武汉,430072
基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目,湖北省自然科学基金项目
摘    要:施工设备费用是水电工程施工成本的重要组成部分,各标段独立配置的设备规模使部分设备在非施工高峰期处于闲置或低效状态.同时,由于协作机制的不完善导致标段间的设备协作效率低下,设备闲置或利用率低的情况时有发生.基于合作对策理论和方法,建立水电工程施工标段间施工设备协作的合作对策模型,以及基于Shapley值方法的合作利益分配机制.合作对策模型和利益分配机制为施工标段间大规模的设备协作提供了理论依据和操作规则,对于提高设备的利用率,降低工程施工成本,提高施工企业经济效益,防止社会资源的浪费具有重要的理论意义和实用价值.

关 键 词:设备协作  合作对策  施工标段  施工管理  水电工程  Shapley值方法

Cooperative Game Model of Construction Equipments Cooperation Among Construction Bid Sections in Hydropower Project
Zhou Hougui,Dai Zhiqing,Zhang Kaiguang,Sun Changzhong,Cao Shengrong.Cooperative Game Model of Construction Equipments Cooperation Among Construction Bid Sections in Hydropower Project[J].Journal of China Three Gorges University(Natural Sciences),2014,36(5):6-9.
Authors:Zhou Hougui  Dai Zhiqing  Zhang Kaiguang  Sun Changzhong  Cao Shengrong
Institution:Zhou Hougui Dai Zhiqing Zhang Kaiguang Sun Changzhong Cao Shengrong (1. China Energy Engineering Group Co. , Ltd. , Beijing 100029, China; 2. China Gezhouba Group Co. , Ltd. , Yichang 443002, China; 3. State Key Laboratory of Water Resources Hydropower Engineering Sci- ence, Wuhan Univ., Wuhan 430072, China)
Abstract:Construction equipment cost is the important part of hydropower project construction cost. Con- struction equipments schemed by construction bid sections respectively are idle or inefficient in low construc- tion intensity period. Because of the faultiness of cooperation mechanism, construction equipment cooperation among construction bid sections is seldom, and idleness or inefficiency of construction equipments occurs of- ten. Based on the theory and methodology of cooperative game, the cooperative game model for construction equipments cooperation among hydropower construction bid sections and distribution mechanism of coopera- tive benefit based on Shapley value method are constituted. The cooperative game model and distribution mechanism provide theoretical background and manipulation rules for large-scale construction equipment coop- eration among construction bid sections. The work in the paper helps much to improve construction equip- ment utilization, reduce construction cost, and improve economic efficiency of construction corporations, pre- vent waste of social resources in theory and project practice.
Keywords:construction equipment cooperation  cooperative game  construction bid section  construction management  hydropower project  Shapley value method
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