考虑环境性能和再制造能力的闭环供应链两部制契约协调研究

在同时考虑产品的环境性能和再制造能力的基础上，运用博弈论分别研究了集中决策和分散决策下的均衡解，并设计了能够实现供应链协调的两部制－两部制契约机制.研究发现：在集中决策下最优产品生命周期与环境性能正相关，与再制造能力负相关；集中决策下的最优产品生命周期低于分散式决策下的最优产品生命周期，但供应链系统的利润大于分散决策下参与者利润之和；在两部制－两部制契约机制下，产品的最优环境性能、最优再制造能力、最优生命周期、制造商的最优利润以及供应链系统的最优利润均与制造商和零售商之间制定的契约无关，而仅与零售商和客户群之间制定的契约相关.

Research on two-part contract coordination of closed-loop supply chains with consideration of environmental performance and remanufacturability

Considering both the environmental performance and the remanufacturability of products， the equilibrium solution under centralized and decentralized decision-making model are studied respectively. And a two-part contract mechanism is designed to realize supply chain coordination. It is found that in the centralized decision， the optimal product life cycle is positively related to the environmental performance， and is negatively related to the remanufacturing capability. The optimal product life cycle under the centralized decision is lower than the optimal product life cycle under the decentralized decision. However， the profit of the supply chain system is greater than the benefit of the participants under the decentralized decision. In the two-part contract mechanism， the optimal environmental performance， optimal remanufacturability， optimal life cycle， manufacturers optimal profit and supply chain optimal total profit are only related to the contract between the retailer and the customer group instead of that between the manufacturer and the retailer.