A pairwise-monotonic core selection for permutation games |
| |
Authors: | Silvia Miquel |
| |
Affiliation: | (1) Department of Actuarial, Financial and Economic Mathematics and CREB, University of Barcelona, Av. Diagonal, 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain |
| |
Abstract: | In this article, a single-valued solution for permutation games is proposed. If we consider that each agent on the permutation game acts both as a buyer and as a seller, a related assignment game with the same reward matrix is defined. In this two-sided related market, the midpoint between the buyers-optimal core allocation and the sellers-optimal core allocation is considered. Then, each agent in the permutation game merges his payoff as a buyer and his payoff as a seller. This solution belongs to the core of the one-sided market and it is pairwise-monotonic. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|