基于批发价契约的多零售商横向转载的供应链协调

研究了多零售商横向转载的供应链批发价契约协调问题。以包含一个制造商和多个零售商的供应链系统为研究对象,基于批发价契约研究了零售商转载下的供应链协调问题,获取了批发价契约可以协调零售商存在横向转载的供应链的理论证据,并给出了相应的产生供应链协调的条件,详细分析了协调情形下供应链系统最优订货量与多零售商无转载及单报童等情形下的最优订货量之间的关系。进一步研究了制造商与零售商在Stackelberg博弈下,零售商横向转载对制造商收益的影响,并提出了在Stackelberg博弈模型中,批发价契约也有可能促使制造商选择供应链系统最优订货量所对应的批发价格,使得供应链协调,且给出了此种协调产生的具体条件。数值算例则对两种供应链协调情形下的订货量、批发价格及期望收益进行了计算与仿真。研究表明,批发价契约可能会使得多零售商存在转载的供应链实现协调,传统的双重边际化效应将会由于制造商和零售商的理性而被弱化。

Supply Chain Coordination With Wholesale Price Contract When Lateral Transshipment among Multi-retailers Exists

This paper studies the wholesale price contract that coordinate a supply chain under the multi-location transshipment environment. We investigate a supply chain system, which consists of one manufacturer and multi retailers. The retailers, who possibly pool their inventories to satisfy unmet demand, that is, movement of a product among the retailers. We prove that a supply chain system may be coordinated with the wholesale price contract by stochastic comparison methods, and we describe the coordinating conditions in mathematical expression. Thus, we make an analytical comparison of the optimal order quantity, wholesale price and expected revenue between the transshipment case and the non-transshipment case. Furthermore, we develope a Stackelberg game model to study the influence of transshipment policy on manufacturer's revenue. Besides, we find that a wholesale price contract may coordinate a supply chain by inducing the manufacturer to choose the whole supply chain system's best price, which corresponds to the optimal order quantity. Then, we show the coordinated conditions to this model. Numerical results show the computation and simulation results about optimal order quantity, as well as a wholesale price and expected revenue. Such conclusions demonstrate that whole sale price contract may coordinate the supply chain system with pooling retailers, and traditional double marginal effect will be mitigated because of manufacturer's rationality and retailers' rationality.