基于组织承诺的企业员工激励机制设计

通过建立数学模型,在传统委托代理理论基础上,将组织承诺纳入企业员工激励机制研究。首先,在员工的组织承诺类型可被观测的信息对称情形下,讨论最优的显性与隐性激励机制。进而,在员工的组织承诺类型无法被观测的信息非对称情形下,探讨依据企业员工的不同外在特征,如风险厌恶程度、工作成本和工作能力等,选择最优的激励机制。最后,进一步考察了企业生产中依赖于人力劳动程度的高低,对员工激励机制设计产生的影响。本研究不仅在理论上完善和拓展了传统委托代理理论,也从组织行为学视角为切实解决企业员工激励问题提供了新的思路与对策。

Research on Incentive Mechanism of Enterprises Based on Organizational Commitment

By setting up mathematical models, this paper puts the organizational commitment theory into the study of explicit and implicit incentive mechanism of enterprises. Firstly, the paper designs the incentive mechanism of enterprises according to the type of their organizational commitment under the symmetric information condition. Secondly, under the asymmetric information condition, the paper researches the explicit and implicit incentive mechanism of enterprises according to their external feature, such as the risk preference, the cost of the job, the working ability. Finally, the paper further reviews the impact of the level of enterprise production depending on human labor on the design of incentive mechanism. This research not only improves the standard principle-agent theory, but also provides new ideas and countermeasures for solving the incentive problems of enterprises.