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基于网络治理的公交服务总效益和各主体决策分析
引用本文:王欢明,诸大建,吴光东. 基于网络治理的公交服务总效益和各主体决策分析[J]. 运筹与管理, 2013, 22(2): 213-221
作者姓名:王欢明  诸大建  吴光东
作者单位:1.大连理工大学 公共管理与法学学院,辽宁 大连 116024; 2.同济大学 经济与管理学院,上海 200092; 3.江西财经大学 旅游与城市管理学院,江西 南昌 330013
基金项目:国家社会科学重点项目(12AGL010);辽宁省社会科学规划基金一般项目(L12BGL007)
摘    要:为解决我国公交服务效率与公平难以兼容问题,本文引入网络治理理论假定政府、企业和社会群体三方合作的基础上,从最大化公交服务效益构建公交服务网络治理模型,剖析政府、企业和社会群体努力水平、控制权配置和产出效率对公交服务总效益的影响,并对模型分析结果进行数据模拟。结果表明:公交服务总效益与三方主体的努力水平、控制权和产出效率紧密相关,只有在合理范围内参与方的努力水平、控制权的提高有利于公交服务效益增加,当超出合理范围时会导致总效益的降低;而三方主体产出效率越高,公交服务总效益越大;控制权配置与自身的产出系数、努力水平相关,产出系数、努力水平越高,则其对应的控制权比例就越大。

关 键 词:城市发展与管理  公交服务总效益  合作博弈  网络治理  控制权  努力水平  
收稿时间:2011-08-04

Profits and Participants' Decisions Analysis in Public Transport Service Based on Network Governance
WANG Huan-ming,ZHU Da-jian,WU Guang-dong. Profits and Participants' Decisions Analysis in Public Transport Service Based on Network Governance[J]. Operations Research and Management Science, 2013, 22(2): 213-221
Authors:WANG Huan-ming  ZHU Da-jian  WU Guang-dong
Affiliation:1. School of Public Administration and Law, Dalian University of Technology, Dalian 116024, China; 2. School of Economy and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China; 3. School of Toutism and Urban Mangement,Jiangxi University of Finance & Economcs Nanchang 330013; China
Abstract:In China, the efficiency and justice of urban public bus transport service are incompatible. To solve the problem, this paper uses network governance theory to construct a tripartite mathematical model, which emphasizes the cooperation among governments, enterprises and social groups and can maximize the profit of public bus transport bus service. At the same time, it anatomizes the control rights, effort levels and output levels of the three subjects and their influences on profits of public bus service. The findings show that the profits of public bus service are closely related with the control rights, effort levels and output levels. The service profits can be improved only when the control rights and effort levels are in some ranges. The service profits are bound up with its output levels. If the output level is higher, the service profits will be bigger. The control rights are correlated positively with their output levels and effort levels. All these conclusions are done well by data simulation.
Keywords:urban development and management  public transport service profits  cooperative game  network governance  control rights  effort level  
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