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基于市场细分的双渠道供应链决策模型
引用本文:陈军,赖信,何圆.基于市场细分的双渠道供应链决策模型[J].运筹与管理,2013,22(5):69-77.
作者姓名:陈军  赖信  何圆
作者单位:重庆交通大学 管理学院,重庆 400074
基金项目:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71301179);教育部高等学校博士点专项基金(20100092120041);现代物流重庆市重点实验室开放基金(CQKLL12004);重庆交通大学科研启动基金项目(201110)
摘    要:提出零售商在一级市场生命周期末开辟二级市场的构想。在市场信息完全的前提下,根据消费者效用选择函数建立了双渠道供应链定价决策模型,并求解出零售商开辟二级市场后的零售商和制造商的最优定价。研究发现:分散式决策模式下,当一级市场仅有网络直销渠道,零售商不会开辟二级市场;当一级市场零售渠道和网络直销渠道都有需求,二级市场引入后的供应链成员利润可能实现Pareto改进;集中式决策模式下,只有一级市场零售渠道、网络直销渠道和二级市场都有需求且二级市场接受度超过临界值后,二级市场引入能提升供应链系统绩效。因此,零售商在特定条件下才会开辟二级市场。

关 键 词:供应链  双渠道  二级市场  定价策略  Stackelberg博弈  
收稿时间:2012-12-05

A Decision Model in a Dual-channel Supply Chain with Market Segmentation
CHEN Jun,LAI Xin,HE Yuan.A Decision Model in a Dual-channel Supply Chain with Market Segmentation[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2013,22(5):69-77.
Authors:CHEN Jun  LAI Xin  HE Yuan
Institution:School of Management, Chongqing Jiaotong University, Chongqing 400074, China
Abstract:An idea that the retailer should open secondary market at the end of the primary market life cycle is proposed. The pricing decision models in a dual-channel supply chain are developed on the assumption that market information is prefect, then the retailer's and the manufacturer's optimal prices are obtained for the case that the retailer opens secondary market with utility function. The conclusion suggests that the retailer doesn't open secondary market if only the direct channel exits in the primary market, and it may contributes to achieving Pareto improvement of the profits for the dual-channel members by the introduction of the secondary market if demands exit for the two channels under decentralized decision model. The system profit increases only if demands exit for the two channels and the two markets, and the parameter of acceptance of the secondary market exceeds a critical value under centralized decision model. So, the retailer opens secondary market under special circumstances.
Keywords:supply chain  dual-channel  secondary market  pricing policy  Stackelberg game  
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