矿山环境恢复治理保证金制度中公众参与的博弈分析:基于合谋与防范的视角

矿产资源开采行为容易造成矿区生态环境的恶化,国内外目前主要采取矿山环境恢复治理保证金制度以强制矿山企业对矿区开采后生态环境进行一系列修复。在缺少公众监督的情况下,保证金制度容易出现道德风险,即矿山企业和地方政府监管者的合谋行为。目前,我国各地推行的矿山环境恢复治理保证金制度均没有让公众参与进来,这就需要对这一制度缺陷进行弥补与修正。本文基于公众参与理论和博弈论构建了公众、矿山企业和政府监管者三方博弈模型,并利用对其混合纳什均衡解的分析,得出结论为:通过提高公众监督概率和公众监督有效概率、降低公众监督成本来防范和控制合谋行为。最后,根据以上分析提出了相关的政策建议。

Game Analysis of Public Participation in Mine Rehabilitation Deposit System: Based on the Perspective of Conspiracy and Prevention

Mineral explorations can cause the deterioration of ecological environment. At home and abroad, the mine rehabilitation deposit system has been set up to compel the mining enterprises to take charge of a series of restoration tasks for mining area ecological environment. However, during the implementing process of this system, it is prone to moral hazard without public supervision, which is the conspiracy behavior between the mining enterprises and local government supervisors. At present, the mine rehabilitation deposit system in China does not include the content of public participation, whose defection needs to be supplemented and revised. This paper has established a tripartite game model of public, mining enterprises and the local government supervisor based on the game theory. According to the equilibrium results of the game model, this research results are that the conspiracy can be prevented and controlled by improving the probability of public supervision and the probability of effective public supervision, and reducing the cost of public supervision. Finally, it has put forward several corresponding policy recommendations.