| 中小私营企业信用行为演化研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 马国建,杜建国,张冬华.中小私营企业信用行为演化研究[J].运筹与管理,2013,22(5):250-255. |
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| 作者姓名： | 马国建 杜建国 张冬华 |
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| 作者单位： | 江苏大学 管理学院,江苏 镇江 212013 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家社科基金资助项目(12BGL025);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171099);教育部人文社科基金资助项目(10YJC790274);江苏省社科基金资助项目(10JD033) |
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| 摘 要： | 运用演化经济学理论,通过建立中小私营企业信用行为演化博弈模型,研究中小私营企业信用行为演化规律,并用计算机仿真技术展示信用行为的演化方向。研究发现:如果中小私营企业追求短期利益、缺乏第三方公正的惩罚及失信后资产损失小,会造成中小私营企业信用行为演化成不良“锁定”状态。
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| 关 键 词： | 中小私营企业 演化博弈 仿真 |
| 收稿时间： | 2012-04-15 |
Evolutionary Research on the Credit Behaviors of Small and Medium Sized Private Enterprises |
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| MA Guo-Jian,DU Jian-guo,ZHANG Dong-Hua.Evolutionary Research on the Credit Behaviors of Small and Medium Sized Private Enterprises[J].Operations Research and Management Science,2013,22(5):250-255. |
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| Authors: | MA Guo-Jian DU Jian-guo ZHANG Dong-Hua |
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| Institution: | School of Management, Jiangsu University, Zhenjiang 212013, China |
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| Abstract: | In order to study the evolutionary law of small and medium sized private enterprises' credit behaviors, this paper applies the theory of evolutionary economics to build their credit behaviors evolutionary game model and shows the evolutionary direction by computer simulation. The study finds that if the small and medium sized private enterprises pursue short-term interests, or they are lack of fair punishment by the third-party organization, and just suffer small-loss of assets after dishonesty, then the credit behaviors of small and medium sized private enterprises will evolve into the bad “lock-in” condition. |
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| Keywords: | small and medium sized private enterprises evolutionary game simulation |
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