Cautious strategy update promotes cooperation in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game |
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Authors: | Yongkui Liu Lin Zhang Xiaojie Chen Lei Ren Long Wang |
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Institution: | 1. School of Electronic and Control Engineering, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China;2. School of Automation Science and Electrical Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China;3. Evolution and Ecology Program, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), Schlossplatz 1, 2361 Laxenburg, Austria;4. Center for Systems and Control, State Key Laboratory for Turbulence and Complex Systems, College of Engineering, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China |
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Abstract: | In the realistic world, individual cautiousness can be often involved or observed when a rational individual makes a decision. However, it remains unclear how such individual cautiousness influences the evolution of cooperative behavior. To this end, we consider a Fermi strategy updating rule, where each individual is assigned a cautiousness index that controls its learning activity, and then study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Interestingly, it is found that cooperation can be significantly promoted when individuals’ cautiousness is considered. In particular, there exists an optimal range of the degree of cautiousness resulting in the highest cooperation level. The remarkable promotion of cooperation, as well as the emerging phase transition is explained by configurational analysis. The sensitivity of cooperation to initial states with different fractions of cooperators is also discussed. The result illustrates that high densities of cooperators can be established at small initial fractions of cooperators. The detailed mechanism for such phenomenon is explained by analyzing the typical initial configurations. |
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Keywords: | Prisoner&rsquo s dilemma Cooperation Cautious |
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