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Min-Max payoffs in a two-player location game |
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| Authors: | S Chawla U Rajan |
| Institution: | a School of Computer Science, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA b Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA c Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA |
| Abstract: | We consider a two-player, sequential location game with arbitrarily distributed consumer demand. Players alternately select locations from a feasible set so as to maximize the consumer mass in their vicinity. Our main result is a complete characterization of feasible market shares, when locations form a finite set in Rd. |
| Keywords: | Location Hotelling game Condorcet paradox Competitive location Centerpoint theorem |
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