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ON OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND ENFORCEMENT: INFORMATION,MONITORING AND EFFICIENCY |
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| Authors: | CARLOS MARIO GÓMEZ GÓMEZ |
| Affiliation: | Universidad de Alcalá Facultad de Ciencias Económicas Plaza de la Victoria s/n Alcalá de Henares, 2802 Madrid, Spain E-mail: EHGOMEZ@ALCALA.ES Institute of Business & Economic Research University of California–Berkeley F502 Haas Berkeley, CA 94720-1922, U.S.A. E-mail: EHGOMEZ@UCLINK.BERKELEY.EDU |
| Abstract: | ABSTRACT. The purpose of the paper is to contribute to the narrowing of the distance between formal theory and practical environmental policy design. We formulate a general and comprehensive theoretical model in order to take into account the different informational and technological problems which characterize the definition and implementation of environmental taxes in a second best world where there also are distortionary taxes. Having formalized these problems, we present a general model which allows us to discuss the existence of efficient and implementable environmental quality objectives and policy instruments, and to analyze many particular cases. |
| Keywords: | Environmental economics economics of regulation asymmetric and private information optimal taxation mechanism design |