ɛ-Consistent equilibrium in repeated games |
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| Authors: | Ehud Lehrer Sylvain Sorin |
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| Affiliation: | (1) School of Mathematical Sciences, Sackler Faculty of Exact Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel (e-mail: lehrer@math.tau.ac.il), IL;(2) Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France (e-mail: sorin@poly.polytechnique.fr), FR;(3) MODALX, UFR SEGMI, Université Paris X-Nanterre, 200 Avenue de la République, 92001 Nanterre, France, FR |
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| Abstract: | We introduce the concept of ɛ-consistent equilibrium where each player plays a ɛ-best response after every history reached with positive probability. In particular, an ɛ-consistent equilibrium induces an ɛ-equilibrium in any subgame reached along the play path. The existence of ɛ-consistent equilibrium is examined in various repeated games. The main result is the existence in stochastic games with absorbing states. Received January 1995/Revised version October 1996/Final version September 1997 |
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