网络团购供应链委托代理激励机制研究

运用委托代理理论的基本原理和方法,以一个供应商和一个团购网站组成的二级供应链为基础,建立了供应商为委托人、团购网站为代理人的博弈模型,研究了供应商对团购网站的激励机制,并利用最优化原理进行了求解得出了最优激励强度系数,并给出了算例.结果表明:总代理成本随风险规避度、市场随机因素方差和产出系数的增加而增加,随团购网站成本系数的增加而减少;供应商确定性等价收益和供应商支付给团购网站的报酬随团购网站成本系数、风险规避度和市场随机因素方差的增加而减少,随团购网站产出系数的增加而增加.

Incentive Mechanism Research Based on the Principal-agent in Online Group Buying Supply Chain

In this paper,a two-stage supply chain game model with a supplier as principal and a website as agent is set up based on the principal-agent theory.Optimization principle is used to get optimal incentive intensity coefficient of the supplier to the group-buying website.And it is further proved with numerical examples that the general agent cost is increasing along with the increase of risk aversion factor,random variance and output coefficient,reducing with the increase of the cost coefficient;supplier certainty equivalent income and payment to the group-buying websites become bigger and bigger followed by the cost coefficient,the risk aversion factor and the random increased and they will also increase when output coefficient decreases.