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Teraoka-type two-person nonzero-sum silent duel
Authors:V J Baston  A Y Garnaev
Institution:(1) Department of Mathematics, University of Southampton, Southampton, England;(2) Department of Computational Mathematics, Civil Engineering Institute, Saint Petersburg, Russia
Abstract:The paper discusses a silent nonzero-sum duel between two players each of whom has a single bullet. The duel is terminated at a random time in 0, 1] given by a cumulative distribution function. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium under a wide range of possible payoff values for simultaneous firing. This contrasts with a very similar game considered by Teraoka for which there are many Nash equilibria.This work was carried out while the second author was visiting the University of Southampton on a Postdoctoral Fellowship of The Royal Society of London.
Keywords:Nonzero-sum games  Nash equilibria  games of timing  silent duels
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