Objective Probability and Quantum Fuzziness |
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Authors: | U Mohrhoff |
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Institution: | (1) Sri Aurobindo International Centre of Education, Pondicherry, 605002, India |
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Abstract: | This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves,
Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the “objective preparations view” or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion
beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including
the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the claim that
the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard
the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads
to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are
neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible
outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the
only testable feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes. Most important among these
are the objective fuzziness of all relative positions and momenta and the consequent incomplete spatiotemporal differentiation
of the physical world. The latter makes it possible to draw a clear distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic.
This in turn makes it possible to understand the special status of measurements in all standard formulations of the theory.
Whereas Bayesians have written contemptuously about the “folly” of conjoining “objective” to “probability,” there are various
reasons why quantum-mechanical probabilities can be considered objective, not least the fact that they are needed to quantify
an objective fuzziness. But this cannot be appreciated without giving thought to the makeup of the world, which Bayesians
refuse to do. Doing this on the basis of how quantum mechanics assigns probabilities, one finds that what constitutes the
macroworld is a single Ultimate Reality, about which we know nothing, except that it manifests the macroworld or manifests
itself as the macroworld. The so-called microworld is neither a world nor a part of any world but instead is instrumental
in the manifestation of the macroworld. Quantum mechanics affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world, at stages in
the process of manifestation, but it does not allow us to describe what lies “behind” the manifested world except in terms
of the finished product—the manifested world, for without the manifested world there is nothing in whose terms we could describe
its manifestation. |
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Keywords: | Quantum mechanics Quantum state Probability Objective probability Fuzziness Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics |
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