Assignment markets that are uniquely determined by their core |
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Authors: | F Javier Martínez-de-AlbénizMarina Núñez Carles Rafels |
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Institution: | Dep. de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial, Universitat de Barcelona, Av. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain |
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Abstract: | A matrix A defines an assignment market, where each row represents a buyer and each column a seller. If buyer i is matched with seller j, the market produces aij units of utility. Quint (1991) points out that usually many different assignment matrices exist that define markets with the same core and poses the question of when the matrix is uniquely determined by the core of the related market. We characterize these matrices in terms of a strong form of the doubly dominant diagonal property. A matching between buyers and sellers is optimal if it produces the maximum units of utility. Our characterization allows us to show that the number of optimal matchings in markets uniquely characterized by their core is a power of two. |
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Keywords: | Cooperative games Assignment game Core Doubly dominant diagonal |
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