机场安全运行监管机制的动态博弈分析

监管机制是否行之有效是决定机场能否长期安全运行的关键所在.针对机场安全运行监管现状,进一步挖掘机场与政府之间内在博弈机理,在引入机场按章运行与违章运行下发生不安全事件概率因子的基础上,构建了机场与政府之间的安全运行动态监管博弈模型,研究了二者在机场安全运行监管过程中博弈双方的策略选择问题.通过对模型混合策略纳什均衡进行...

Dynamic Game Analysis of Airport Security Operation Supervision Mechanism

Whether the supervision mechanism is effective or not is the key to the longterm security operation of the airport.In view of the current situation of airport security operation supervision,the probabilities of unsafe events under legal and illegal operation were introduced respectively based on the analysis of internal game mechanism between government and airport.And then,the strategic choices of the two players in the process of airport security operation supervision were studied through building a dynamic supervision game model of government and airport.By solving the Nash equilibrium of the mixed strategy of the model,the factors of government and airport strategy selection were discussed respectively.The result indicates that the government’s regulatory capacity and the probability of unsafe event under illegal operation have a significant impact on game equilibrium.Though further analysis of the airport’s revenue and cost,the motives of the airport’s possible violation were revealed.It proves that government strictly reviews the airport’s non-airborne benefits and operational costs.And relevant policy recommendations have been given,in order to provide a theoretical basis for the regulatory authorities to improve the airport security operation supervision system.