| 动态 Stackelberg 诱导对策问题 |
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| 引用本文： | 曾晓军. 动态 Stackelberg 诱导对策问题[J]. 系统科学与数学, 1991, 11(4): 361-366 |
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| 作者姓名： | 曾晓军 |
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| 作者单位： | 厦门大学计算机与系统科学系 福建361005 |
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| 基金项目： | 中国科学院管理决策与信息系统开放实验室，国家科学基金 |
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| 摘 要： | Stackelberg 诱导(Incentive)对策,以简单的二人对策来说,是讨论对一个具有递阶决策结构的系统,处于领导地位的决策者,如何通过选择和宣布适当的策略,来诱导处于随从地位的决策者采取对领导最为有利行动的问题.自从文[1]从控制理论的观点讨论了 Incentive 的概念后,Stackelberg 诱导对策的研究受到了较多的关注,发现了不少研究成果.然而从到迄今所出现的文献来看,对概念性问题的研究较多,而较缺乏有效的,特
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DYNAMIC STACKELBERG INCENTIVE GAME PROBLEMS |
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| ZENG XIAO-JUN. DYNAMIC STACKELBERG INCENTIVE GAME PROBLEMS[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences, 1991, 11(4): 361-366 |
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| Authors: | ZENG XIAO-JUN |
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| Affiliation: | Department of Compter and Systems Sciences,Xiamen University,361005 |
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| Abstract: | In this paper,a convex analytical method is presented to solve dynamic Stackelberg in-centive game problems.The main idea of this method is,by using some results in convex ana-lysis,transforming a complex incentive problem into a simple incentive problem with linearcharacter,and then solving this simple incentive problem.Through this method,the existenceresults and the explicit expressions of optimal incentive strategies are given for a large class ofdynamic Stackelberg incentive problem. |
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