Bargaining and membership |
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Authors: | María Gómez-Rúa Juan Vidal-Puga |
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Affiliation: | 1. Facultade de CC. Económicas e Empresariais, Universidade de Vigo, Campus Lagoas-Marcosende, s/n, Vigo (Pontevedra), Spain
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Abstract: | In coalitional games in which the players are partitioned into groups, we study the incentives of the members of a group to leave it and become singletons. In this context, we model a non-cooperative mechanism in which each player has to decide whether to stay in her group or to exit and act as a singleton. We show that players, acting myopically, always reach a Nash equilibrium. |
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