属间远缘杂交水稻耐旱性生理特性的比较研究

采用在ＹＯＳＨＩＤＡ水稻专用培养营养液中添加一定量的ＰＥＧ ６０００的方法，比较研究了模拟干旱胁迫条件下属间远缘杂交新型水稻品种“远诱１号”（Ｙ）及其水稻亲本“圭６３０”（Ｇ）、高梁亲本“桃长红”（Ｔ）以及生产推广杂交组合“汕优６３”（Ｓ）等试验材料某些生态生理特性的差异。研究结果表明，在－１．０ＭＰａ的高渗胁迫下，Ｙ、Ｇ、Ｔ的萌发系数均有不同程度的下降，正常培养条件下的萌发系数ＧＣ分别为３６．９     

重庆汽车产业配置与地域类型

运用产业经济学和区域经济地理学的原理、结合地理学的分析方法,着重探讨了重庆汽车产业配置地域运动过程和促使其演变的原因.划分重庆汽车产业分布为四种地域类型:“嘉陵江东岸与长江北岸型”;“长江南岸型”;“嘉陵江西岸型”;“飞地型”.对重庆汽车产业配置特点,存在问题作了深入地剖析与揭示,并对今后调整作了初步的设想.     

城市土地规划的优化方法研究

以多目标决策理论、组合优化理论以及预测科学技术为依据 ,首先建立了土地功能配置模型 ,帮助规划师对各种不同功能土地的片面布置进行分析 ,从而找到最合理的城市土地布局 ;然后以遗传算法作为优化工具 ,对建立的模型进行了优化。     

Approximation algorithms for dynamic resource allocation

We consider a problem of allocating limited quantities of M types of resources among N independent activities that evolve over T epochs. In each epoch, we assign to each activity a task which consumes resources, generates utility, and determines the subsequent state of the activity. We study the complexity of, and approximation algorithms for, maximizing average utility.     

Heuristic Solution Methods for the Multilevel Generalized Assignment Problem

The multilevel generalized assignment problem is a problem of assigning agents to tasks where the agents can perform tasks at more than one efficiency level. A profit is associated with each assignment and the objective of the problem is profit maximization. Two heuristic solution methods are presented for the problem. The heuristics are developed from solution methods for the generalized assignment problem. One method uses a regret minimization approach whilst the other method uses a repair approach on a relaxation of the problem. The heuristics are able to solve moderately large instances of the problem rapidly and effectively. Procedures for deriving an upper bound on the solution of the problem are also described. On larger and harder instances of the problem one heuristic is particularly effective.     

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes

The paper introduces a refinement of the notion of population monotonic allocation scheme, called regular population monotonic allocation scheme (regularpmas). This refinement is based on economic situations in which players may have to select new partners from a set of potential players and in which there exist certain capacity constraints. A sufficient condition for the existence of a regularpmas is given. For the class of games with regularpmas, we prove that the core coincides with the Davis and Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets.     

用于波分复用系统的多峰干涉滤光片

介绍了用于波分复用系统的多峰干涉滤光片的设计原理,提出了滤光片透射峰位置的确定方法,讨论了影响滤光片半宽度和截止度的因素,给出了滤光片的膜厚容差分析结果,表明透射率监控标准偏差在<0.5%范围内,可以得到波形良好的多峰滤光片,最后给出了实验结果.     

Allocating electricity transmission costs through tracing: a game-theoretic rationale

Tracing is a method of assigning flows in an electricity network to particular generators and loads, assuming perfect mixing at each node. It can be used to assign costs to transmission users. We show that the resulting allocation is equal to the Shapley value of an equivalent co-operative game.     

一类Narcissistic反应过渡态的优化

我们对一类narcissistic 反应XCH_2-CH_2Y→[过渡态TS]→YCH_2—CH_2X (1)进行了研究,结果表明其过渡态能在对称性限制下由能量极小化方法较容易地给出. 采用IMSPAK分子轨道从头算程序,在IBM VM/370计算机系统上用STO—3G极小基组以平衡几何构型的能量梯度优化方法,在对称性限制下对反应(1)的几种反应体系的过渡态构型进行了优化,其结果列于表1.     

Compensatory transfers in two-player decision problems

This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer money between themselves.The solutions form a one-parameter family, where the parameter is a non-negative number, t.The solutions can be interpreted as follows: Any efficient action can be selected. Based on this action, compute for each player a “best claim for compensation”. A claim for compensation is the difference between the value of an alternative action and the selected efficient action, minus a penalty proportional to the extent to which the alternative action is inefficient. The coefficient of proportionality of this penalty is t. The best claim for compensation for a player is the maximum of this computed claim over all possible alternative actions. The solution, at the parameter value t, is to implement the chosen efficient action and make a monetary transfer equal to the average of these two best claims. The characterization relies on three main axioms. The paper presents and justifies these axioms and compares them to related conditions used in other bargaining contexts. In Nash Bargaining Theory, the axioms analogous to these three are in conflict with each other. In contrast, in the quasi-linear social choice setting of this paper, all three conditions can be satisfied simultaneously.This work was supported by the Division of Research at the Harvard Business School. Thanks are due to the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University for its kind hospitality during the Spring of 2002. I have received helpful advice and comments from Youngsub Chun, Ehud Kalai, Herve Moulin, Al Roth, Ilya Segal, Adam Szeidl, Richard Zeckhauser, and other members of the Theory Seminars at Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Rice and Northwestern.