逆（反）对策问题与“奇门遁甲”预测理论（术）

本文首先提出逆（反）对策这一新问题，给出了数学模型；探讨了“奇门遁甲”预测理论（术）中的数学问题；通过系统分析“专门遁甲”预测过程，可知它的预测过程隐含着一个特殊的逆（反）对策问题；最后指出逆（反）对策问题的广泛存在并给出案例分析．     

CONFLICT AND COOPERATION IN UTILIZING A COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCE

Noncooperative games are used to demonstrate that, while free riding is always an option, the “tragedy of the commons” is not inevitable. When the decision to cooperate or free ride is considered in a dynamic setting, there is no intermediate case where some cooperate and others free ride. The game is only stabilized in either full cooperation or full defection. The important factor in obtaining a cooperative outcome is the critical number of players that decide to cooperate. The concept of commitment is used to demonstrate the necessary and sufficient conditions for full cooperation. Although the analysis is based on a shared water resource, it can be extended to other natural resources with common costs and private benefits, especially in the cases where there are no international authorities or treaties that internalize the externalities involved in privatizing the resource.     

Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of positive solutions to algebraic Riccati equations with indefinite quadratic term

Necessary and sufficient conditions are established in this paper for the existence of positive- and/or negative-definite solutions to the algebraic Riccati equation with indefinite coefficient. An iterative procedure is also given for computing such a solution.Project supported by the National Science Foundation of China and by the special program of the State Education Commission of China under grant 9033507.     

Effects of Some Topological Ingredients on the Evolutionary Ultimatum Game

This study aims at figuring out the crucial topological ingredients which affect the outcomes of the ultimatum game located on different networks,encompassing the regular network,the random network,the small world network,and the scale-free network.With the aid of random interchanging algorithm,we investigate the relations between the outcomes of the ultimatum game and some topological ingredients,including the average range,the clustering coefficient and the heterogeneity,and so forth.It is found that for the regular,random and small-work networks,the average range and the clustering coefficient have evident impacts on the ultimatum game,while for the scale-free network the original degree heterogeneity and the underlying rich-club characterizations are the mainly important topologica ingredients that influence the outcomes of ultimatum game substantially.     

整治非法煤矿的博弈论分析

通过建立博弈模型,分析事故频发的原因,并提出相应对策．指出设立举报奖金,消除矿工举报的后顾之忧,降低监督成本从而增加监督频率,加大惩罚力度是减少事故的关键．     

On the strategic origin of Brownian motion in finance

This paper is concerned with the strategic use of a private information on the stock market. A repeated auction model is used to analyze the evolution of the price system on a market with asymmetric information.  The model turns out to be a zero-sum repeated game with one-sided information, as introduced by Aumann and Maschler.  The stochastic evolution of the price system can be explicitly computed in the n times repeated case. As n grows to ∞, this process tends to a continuous time martingale related to a Brownian Motion.  This paper provides in this way an endogenous justification for the appearance of Brownian Motion in Finance theory. Received: February 2002     

Emergence of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional participation

Conditional interactions are common in both human and animal societies. To understand the impacts of this feature on the evolution of cooperation, we propose a modified public goods game combined with conditional interactions in terms of the aspiration payoffs. Through simulations, we find that the function of the fraction of cooperators and the synergy factor is non-monotonic. This indicates that a large synergy factor is not always in favor of the promotion of cooperation. In addition, for a high aspiration, the typical coexistence state of cooperators and defectors could disappear, and the system demonstrates a sharp transition from the complete defection state to the complete cooperation state as the synergy factor increases. Furthermore, an interesting critical phenomenon is found in a finite system, i.e., the system can randomly evolve into a complete defection state or a complete cooperation state. An explanation of these evolutionary outcomes is provided in this paper, which is in agreement with the simulation results.     

Integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game

A fundamental question of human society is the evolution of cooperation. Many previous studies explored this question via setting spatial background, where players obtain their payoffs by playing game with their nearest neighbors. Another undoubted fact is that the environment plays an important role in the individual development. Inspired by these phenomena, we reconsider the definition of individual fitness which integrates the environment, denoted by the average payoff of all individual neighbors, with the traditional individual payoffs by introducing a selection parameter u. Tuning u equal to zero returns the traditional version, while increasing u bears the influence of environment. We find that considering the environment, i.e., integrating neighborhoods in the evaluation of fitness, promotes cooperation. If we enhance the value of u, the invasion of defection could be resisted better. We also provide quantitative explanations and complete phase diagrams presenting the influence of the environment on the evolution of cooperation. Finally, the universality of this mechanism is testified for different neighborhood sizes, different topology structures and different game models. Our work may shed light on the emergence and persistence of cooperation in our life.     

”Illusion of control” in Time-Horizon Minority and Parrondo Games

Human beings like to believe they are in control of their destiny. This ubiquitous trait seems to increase motivation and persistence, and is probably evolutionarily adaptive [J.D. Taylor, S.E. Brown, Psych. Bull. 103, 193 (1988); A. Bandura, Self-efficacy: the exercise of control (WH Freeman, New York, 1997)]. But how good really is our ability to control? How successful is our track record in these areas? There is little understanding of when and under what circumstances we may over-estimate [E. Langer, J. Pers. Soc. Psych. 7, 185 (1975)] or even lose our ability to control and optimize outcomes, especially when they are the result of aggregations of individual optimization processes. Here, we demonstrate analytically using the theory of Markov Chains and by numerical simulations in two classes of games, the Time-Horizon Minority Game [M.L. Hart, P. Jefferies, N.F. Johnson, Phys. A 311, 275 (2002)] and the Parrondo Game [J.M.R. Parrondo, G.P. Harmer, D. Abbott, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5226 (2000); J.M.R. Parrondo, How to cheat a bad mathematician (ISI, Italy, 1996)], that agents who optimize their strategy based on past information may actually perform worse than non-optimizing agents. In other words, low-entropy (more informative) strategies under-perform high-entropy (or random) strategies. This provides a precise definition of the “illusion of control” in certain set-ups a priori defined to emphasize the importance of optimization. An erratum to this article is available at .     

Motif structure and cooperation in real-world complex networks

Networks of dynamical nodes serve as generic models for real-world systems in many branches of science ranging from mathematics to physics, technology, sociology and biology. Collective behavior of agents interacting over complex networks is important in many applications. The cooperation between selfish individuals is one of the most interesting collective phenomena. In this paper we address the interplay between the motifs’ cooperation properties and their abundance in a number of real-world networks including yeast protein-protein interaction, human brain, protein structure, email communication, dolphins’ social interaction, Zachary karate club and Net-science coauthorship networks. First, the amount of cooperativity for all possible undirected subgraphs with three to six nodes is calculated. To this end, the evolutionary dynamics of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game is considered and the cooperativity of each subgraph is calculated as the percentage of cooperating agents at the end of the simulation time. Then, the three- to six-node motifs are extracted for each network. The significance of the abundance of a motif, represented by a Z-value, is obtained by comparing them with some properly randomized versions of the original network. We found that there is always a group of motifs showing a significant inverse correlation between their cooperativity amount and Z-value, i.e. the more the Z-value the less the amount of cooperativity. This suggests that networks composed of well-structured units do not have good cooperativity properties.