Surplus division and investment incentives in supply chains: A biform-game analysis

In this paper, we use a biform-game approach for analyzing the impact of surplus division in supply chains on investment incentives. In the first stage of the game, firms decide non-cooperatively on investments. In the second stage, the surplus is shared according to the Shapley value. We find that all firms have inefficiently low investment incentives which, however, depend on their position in the supply chain. Cross-subsidies for investment costs can mitigate, but not eliminate the underinvestment problem. Vertical integration between at least some firms.yields efficient investments, but may nevertheless reduce the aggregated payoff of the firms. We show how the size of our effects depends on the structure of the supply chain and the efficiency of the investment technology. Various extensions demonstrate that our results are qualitatively robust.     

约束凸性与连续诱导策略的存在性

本文研究随从目标函数非凸时的诱导问题.提出函数约束凸性的概念,得到了函数在某点具有约束凸性的充要条件和具有约束凸性的函数取最小值的充分条件,并利用约束凸性的概念得出了随从目标函数非凸时连续诱导策略存在性的充要条件.     

Response time and vendor–assembler relationship in a supply chain

Relationships between an assembler and a vendor in a supply chain are investigated in two-period models when the assembler wants to reduce response time by incentive systems. The assembler may offer myopic or farsighted incentive contracts to the vendor, under short-term or long-term relationships. Incentive schemes, effort levels, and expected payoffs under different perspectives and relationships are examined. We find that a farsighted assembler provides the vendor with a higher incentive than a myopic assembler in the first period. A long (short)-term relationship is preferred if the value of farsightedness under a long-term relationship is greater (less) than the switching option value under a short-term relationship. We propose several sufficient conditions regarding which perspectives and relationships are preferred.     

Supply chain analysis under a price-discount incentive scheme for electric vehicles

We investigate an automobile supply chain where a manufacturer and a retailer serve heterogeneous consumers with electric vehicles (EVs) under a government’s price-discount incentive scheme that involves a price discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We show that the subsidy ceiling is more effective in influencing the optimal wholesale pricing decision of the manufacturer with a higher unit production cost. However, the discount rate is more effective for the manufacturer with a lower unit production cost. Moreover, the expected sales are increasing in the discount rate but may be decreasing in the subsidy ceiling. Analytic results indicate that an effective incentive scheme should include both a discount rate and a subsidy ceiling. We also derive the necessary condition for the most effective discount rate and subsidy ceiling that maximize the expected sales of EVs, and obtain a unique discount rate and subsidy ceiling that most effectively improve the manufacturer’s incentive for EV production.     

宜昌市废旧家电回收利用现状与对策分析

通过对宜昌市废旧家电回收处理体系的调查以及对宜昌市消费者回收态度的分析,揭示了宜昌市废旧家电回收利用的现状以及存在的主要问题;并根据宜昌市市情和消费者态度提出了废旧家电回收的可行性建议,即消费者激励机制,包括经济激励机制和非经济激励机制。     

Optimal insurance with belief heterogeneity and incentive compatibility

People may evaluate risk differently in the insurance market. Motivated by this, we examine an optimal insurance problem allowing the insured and the insurer to have heterogeneous beliefs about loss distribution. To reduce ex post moral hazard, we follow Huberman et al. (1983) to assume that alternative insurance contracts satisfy the principle of indemnity and the incentive-compatible constraint. Under the assumption that the insurance premium is calculated by the expected value principle, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for an optimal insurance solution and provide a practical scheme to improve any suboptimal insurance strategy under an arbitrary form of belief heterogeneity. By virtue of this condition, we explore qualitative properties of optimal solutions, and derive optimal insurance contracts explicitly for some interesting forms of belief heterogeneity. As a byproduct of this investigation, we find that Theorem 3.6 of Young (1999) is not completely true.     

Managing supply chain backorders under vendor managed inventory: An incentive approach and empirical analysis

This paper shows how a manufacturer may use an incentive contract with a distributor under a VMI arrangement to gain market share. The manufacturer promises a distributor lower inventory levels in exchange for efforts by the distributor to convert potential lost sales due to stockouts to backorders. Data gathered from a third party provider of information services are then used to illustrate that this incentive arrangement may, at least implicitly, be employed in industry. Our data estimations show that when a manufacturer and distributor are operating under a VMI arrangement, lower inventory at the distributor is associated with a higher conversion rate of lost sales stockouts to backorders.     

解析对冲基金经理人的收费最大化问题

由于近年来对冲基金发展迅速,对冲基金经理人收费最大化问题也成为学者关注的焦点。文中将研究对冲基金经理人价值最大化的2篇文章作对比,其次考虑在只收取激励费和高水位线有增长率的情况下,分析对冲基金经理人的价值最大化问题。     

基于需求分析视角的科技人才创新创业激励机制研究

在对覆盖浙江全省11个市(地)共2 323名科技人才激发其创新创业机制现状调查的基础上,从当前存在的主要困难、制约因素及对政府改进工作期许等方面,分析了科技人才创新创业需求。基于难于争取到项目和经费不足的主要困难,科研激励机制不完善、项目等科技资源分配不合理的主要制约因素,以及最希望政府优先建立完善公平合理的科技立项程序与审批制度、科技成果的评价和奖励制度的重点需求,针对性提出了关于激励科技人才创新创业机制的政策建议。