One-Element Extensions in the Variety Generated by Tournaments

We investigate congruences in one-element extensions of algebras in the variety generated by tournaments.     

LA RECONSTRUCTION DES TOURNOIS SANS DIAMANT

We prove that if T is a tournament of order n > 6 in which any 4-sub-tournament is hamiltonian or transitive, then T is reconstructible in the sense of Ulam.     

Structure theorem for tournaments omitting N5

A finite tournament T is tight if the class of finite tournaments omitting T is well‐quasi‐ordered. We show here that a certain tournament N₅ on five vertices is tight. This is one of the main steps in an exact classification of the tight tournaments, as explained in [10]; the third and final step is carried out in [11]. The proof involves an encoding of the indecomposable tournaments omitting N₅ by a finite alphabet, followed by an application of Kruskal's Tree Theorem. This problem arises in model theory and in computational complexity in a more general form, which remains open: the problem is to give an effective criterion for a finite set {T₁,…,T_k} of finite tournaments to be tight in the sense that the class of all finite tournaments omitting each of T₁,…,T_k is well‐quasi‐ordered. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Graph Theory 42: 165–192, 2003     

福建省首届大学生化学实验邀请赛无机及分析化学实验试题解析

介绍了福建省首届大学生化学实验邀请赛无机及分析化学实验的命题思路、试题原题及评分规则,并对实验中存在的问题及成绩进行了总结分析。     

A lower bound on the size of an absorbing set in an arc-coloured tournament

Bousquet, Lochet and Thomassé recently gave an elegant proof that for any integer $n$, there is a least integer $f\left(n\right)$ such that any tournament whose arcs are coloured with $n$ colours contains a subset of vertices $S$ of size $f\left(n\right)$ with the property that any vertex not in $S$ admits a monochromatic path to some vertex of $S$. In this note we provide a lower bound on the value $f\left(n\right)$.     

Hamilton cycles,avoiding prescribed arcs,in close-to-regular tournaments

The local irregularity of a digraph D is defined as i_l(D) = max {|d⁺ (x) − d⁻ (x)| : x ϵ V(D)}. Let T be a tournament, let Γ = {V₁, V₂, …, V_c} be a partition of V(T) such that |V₁| ≥ |V₂| ≥ … ≥ |V_c|, and let D be the multipartite tournament obtained by deleting all the arcs with both end points in the same set in Γ. We prove that, if |V(T)| ≥ max{2i_l(T) + 2|V₁| + 2|V₂| − 2, i_l(T) + 3|V₁| − 1}, then D is Hamiltonian. Furthermore, if T is regular (i.e., i_l(T) = 0), then we state slightly better lower bounds for |V(T)| such that we still can guarantee that D is Hamiltonian. Finally, we show that our results are best possible. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. J Graph Theory 32: 123–136, 1999     

Remarks on the second neighborhood problem

The second neighborhood conjecture of Seymour asserts that for any orientation G = (V,E), there exists a vertex υ ∈ V so that |N⁺(υ)| ≤ |N⁺⁺(υ)|. The conjecture was resolved by Fisher for tournaments. In this article, we prove the second neighborhood conjecture for several additional classes of dense orientations. We also prove some approximation results, and reduce an asymptotic version of the conjecture to a finite case. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. J Graph Theory 55: 208–220, 2007     

Universal arcs in local tournaments

An arc $uv$ of a digraph $D$ is called universal if $uv$ and $w$ are in a common cycle for any vertex $w$ of $D$. In this paper we characterize local tournaments whose every arc is universal.     

赋权矩阵及其性质

本文给出了以S为行权和向量的权矩阵类T_＋(S)中每个权矩阵都可逆的一个充要条件．     

Using an Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Exit Option to Study Alliance Behavior: Results of a Tournament and Simulation

Nearly half of all strategic alliances fail (Park and Russo, 1996; Dyer et al., 2001), often because of opportunistic behavior by one party or the other. We use a tournament and simulation to study strategies in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game with exit option to shed light on how a firm should react to an opportunistic partner. Our results indicate that a firm should give an alliance partner a second chance following an opportunistic act but that subsequent behavior should be contingent on the value of the next best opportunity outside the alliance. Firms should be more forgiving if the potential benefits from the alliance exceed other opportunities. The strategies were also found to be robust across a wide range of game lengths. The implications of these results for alliance strategies are discussed. Steven E. Phelan received his PhD in economics from La Trobe University (Australia) in 1998. Following five years at the University of Texas at Dallas, he joined the faculty of the University of Nevada Las Vegas in 2003. Dr. Phelan's research interests include competitive dynamics, organizational efficiency, acquisition and alliance performance, and entrepreneurial competence. His methods of choice to study these phenomena include agent-based modelling, experimental game theory, and event studies. Prior to joining academia, Dr. Phelan held executive positions in the telecommunications and airline industries and was a principal partner in Bridges Management Group, a consultancy specializing in strategic investment decisions. Richard J. Arend is a graduate of the University of British Columbia's doctoral program in Policy Analysis and Strategy. He is on the Management faculty of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, arriving most recently from the Management faculty of New York University's Stern School of Business. Dr. Arend's interests lie in the analysis of unusual modes of firm value creation and destruction, where he has published in several top journals. He is a professional engineer with work and consulting experience in aerospace and computing. Darryl A. Seale joined the faculty of UNLV in 1999, following three years at Kent State University and the University of Alabama in Huntsville. Prior to Alabama, he completed his Ph.D. and M.S. degrees in Business Administration at the University of Arizona, his M.B.A. from Penn State University, and spent over ten years in management and market planning positions in the health care industry. Professor Seale's research interests include strategic decision making, bargaining and negotiation, and behavioral game theory. His research has been funded by the National Science Foundation and has been published in top-tier journals including Management Science, OBHDP, Games and Economic Behavior, and Strategic Management Journal. His teaching interests include business policy/strategy, managerial decision making, and bargaining and negotiation.