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1.
We consider a resource management problem in which the management objective is to minimize fluctuations in resource stocks. Stabilizing management policies constitute the designing of memoryless state feedback control strategies for a discrete time resource model which contains unknown but bounded fluctuations. We also show that the problem of maximizing sustainable yield in an uncertain fishery can be considered as the problem of stabilizing of the stock level.The paper corresponds to an invited talk at the 14th Symposium on Operations Research, Ulm, September 6–8, 1989.The support by Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.This work was supported by NSF and AFOSR under grant ECS 8602524. 相似文献
2.
Vivek F. Farias 《Operations Research Letters》2006,34(2):180-190
We consider a problem of allocating limited quantities of M types of resources among N independent activities that evolve over T epochs. In each epoch, we assign to each activity a task which consumes resources, generates utility, and determines the subsequent state of the activity. We study the complexity of, and approximation algorithms for, maximizing average utility. 相似文献
3.
The multilevel generalized assignment problem is a problem of assigning agents to tasks where the agents can perform tasks at more than one efficiency level. A profit is associated with each assignment and the objective of the problem is profit maximization. Two heuristic solution methods are presented for the problem. The heuristics are developed from solution methods for the generalized assignment problem. One method uses a regret minimization approach whilst the other method uses a repair approach on a relaxation of the problem. The heuristics are able to solve moderately large instances of the problem rapidly and effectively. Procedures for deriving an upper bound on the solution of the problem are also described. On larger and harder instances of the problem one heuristic is particularly effective. 相似文献
4.
Josep Maria Izquierdo 《TOP》2006,14(2):375-398
The paper introduces a refinement of the notion of population monotonic allocation scheme, called regular population monotonic
allocation scheme (regularpmas). This refinement is based on economic situations in which players may have to select new partners from a set of potential
players and in which there exist certain capacity constraints. A sufficient condition for the existence of a regularpmas is given. For the class of games with regularpmas, we prove that the core coincides with the Davis and Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets. 相似文献
5.
ON HYPERBOLIC TIME DISCOUNTING IN EXHAUSTIBLE RESOURCE MODELS: AN APPLICATION TO WORLD OIL RESOURCES
JOHN ROWSE 《Natural Resource Modeling》2006,19(2):243-277
ABSTRACT. Recent research on discounting in long term economic models involves hyperbolic discounting, in which the marginal discount rate shrinks as time passes. To investigate hyperbolic discounting and exhaustible resource allocation, this work develops a discrete‐time world oil model and model solution procedure, then uses the model to examine the consequences of adopting conventional (constant annual) discounting when hyperbolic discounting is appropriate, of adopting one hyperbolic discount rate path when a different hyperbolic path is appropriate, and of adopting hyperbolic discounting when conventional discounting is appropriate. Five conventional and two hyperbolic discount rate paths are considered. One hyperbolic path is that used by Nordhaus and Boyer [2000]; the other is that recommended by Weitzman [2001]. The generality of the findings is also assessed. 相似文献
6.
资源有限的加权总完工时间单机排序问题 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
本讨论资源有限的加权总工时间单机排序问题,对现在仍为OPEN问题1|pj=bj-ajuj,∑uj≤U|∑wjCj给出了一个有关最优解中最优资源分配的重要性质,并利用该性质分别给出了三种情况bj=b,wj=w,aj=a;bj=b,wj=w,uj=u;aj=a,wj=w,uj=u的最优算法。 相似文献
7.
8.
Tracing is a method of assigning flows in an electricity network to particular generators and loads, assuming perfect mixing at each node. It can be used to assign costs to transmission users. We show that the resulting allocation is equal to the Shapley value of an equivalent co-operative game. 相似文献
9.
Jerry Green 《International Journal of Game Theory》2005,33(2):159-180
This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer money between themselves.The solutions form a one-parameter family, where the parameter is a non-negative number, t.The solutions can be interpreted as follows: Any efficient action can be selected. Based on this action, compute for each player a “best claim for compensation”. A claim for compensation is the difference between the value of an alternative action and the selected efficient action, minus a penalty proportional to the extent to which the alternative action is inefficient. The coefficient of proportionality of this penalty is t. The best claim for compensation for a player is the maximum of this computed claim over all possible alternative actions. The solution, at the parameter value t, is to implement the chosen efficient action and make a monetary transfer equal to the average of these two best claims. The characterization relies on three main axioms. The paper presents and justifies these axioms and compares them to related conditions used in other bargaining contexts. In Nash Bargaining Theory, the axioms analogous to these three are in conflict with each other. In contrast, in the quasi-linear social choice setting of this paper, all three conditions can be satisfied simultaneously.This work was supported by the Division of Research at the Harvard Business School. Thanks are due to the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University for its kind hospitality during the Spring of 2002. I have received helpful advice and comments from Youngsub Chun, Ehud Kalai, Herve Moulin, Al Roth, Ilya Segal, Adam Szeidl, Richard Zeckhauser, and other members of the Theory Seminars at Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Rice and Northwestern. 相似文献
10.