长白山土壤腹足类物种多样性初步研究

自1993年5月至10月对吉林长白山森林生态系统定位站的土壤腹足类进行了多样性调查，据初步调查的结果显示，长白山地区土壤腹足类种类少而单调，采样区仅发现15种，隶属于腹足纲9科13属，采样区土壤腹足类物种多样性指数和丰富度指数都是5月份最低，8月份达最大值，之后逐渐减小；均匀度指数5月份最高，7月份最低；单纯度指数也是5月份最高，最低值出现在10月份，土壤表层的陆生贝类物种多样性指数高于上层。     

基于CSCW的协同编著系统的设计

讨论了计算机支持的协同工作(CSCW)的主要技术，其中重点讨论了协同编著系统设计中的并发控制技术，指出了其与传统的并发控制技术的区别。根据CSCW的基本原理设计出了一个基于Browse／Server结构的协同编著系统的系统模型。该系统模型比传统的模型更加方便了用户之间通过Internet的浏览器进行协作。     

On the Convenience to Form Coalitions or Partnerships in Simple Games

A partnership in a cooperative game is a coalition that possesses an internal structure and, simultaneously, behaves as an individual member. Forming partnerships leads to a modification of the original game which differs from the quotient game that arises when one or more coalitions are actually formed. In this paper, the Shapley value is used to discuss the convenience to form either coalitions or partnerships. To this end, the difference between the additive Shapley value of the partnership in the partnership game and the Shapley alliance value of the coalition, and also between the corresponding value of the internal and external players, are analysed. Simple games are especially considered. Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund.     

Sufficient optimality conditions and duality in vector optimization with invex-convexlike functions

We prove the Kuhn-Tucker sufficient optimality condition, the Wolfe duality, and a modified Mond-Weir duality for vector optimization problems involving various types of invex-convexlike functions. The class of such functins contains many known generalized convex functions. As applications, we demonstrate that, under invex-convexlikeness assumptions, the Pontryagin maximum principle is a sufficient optimality condition for cooperative differential games. The Wolfe duality is established for these games.The author is indebted to the referees and Professor W. Stadler for valuable remarks and comments, which have been used to revise considerably the paper.     

Strong,large distance impurity dipole interaction in KNbO3 single crystals

It is found that the unrelaxed impurity dipoles can arrange themselves linearly in the structure joining each other end-to-end in pseudocubic [110] direction at the tetragonal to the orthorhombic phase transition. It is shown that this alignment precedes the domain formation at the phase transition, which implies quick movements of the dipoles in the structure, and a strong dipolar interaction. The experiments with the application of dc fields to the crystals showed that the dipolar interaction becomes stronger with the field. The dipoles can see each other across the existing domain walls implying the large distance nature of the interaction. The observation of impurity clusters arranged in pseudocubic [110] direction confirmed the large distance nature of the interaction. It is concluded that this strong, large distance interaction is very interesting in as much as such an interaction of dipoles forms the basis of ferroelectricity.     

Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in the marketplace

Two games of interacting between a coalition of players in a marketplace and the residual players acting there are discussed, along with two approaches to fair imputation of gains of coalitions in cooperative games that are based on the concepts of the Shapley vector and core of a cooperative game. In the first game, which is an antagonistic one, the residual players try to minimize the coalition's gain, whereas in the second game, which is a noncooperative one, they try to maximize their own gain as a coalition. A meaningful interpretation of possible relations between gains and Nash equilibrium strategies in both games considered as those played between a coalition of firms and its surrounding in a particular marketplace in the framework of two classes of n-person games is presented. A particular class of games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in which models of firms operating in the marketplace are those with linear constraints and utility functions being sums of linear and bilinear functions of two corresponding vector arguments is analyzed, and a set of maximin problems on polyhedral sets of connected strategies which the problem of choosing a coalition for a particular firm is reducible to are formulated based on the firm models of the considered kind.     

Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solutions in Stochastic Differential Games

Subgame consistency is a fundamental element in the solution of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, it ensures that: (i) the extension of the solution policy to a later starting time and to any possible state brought about by the prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal; (ii) all players do not have incentive to deviate from the initial plan. In this paper, we develop a mechanism for the derivation of the payoff distribution procedures of subgame consistent solutions in stochastic differential games with transferable payoffs. The payoff distribution procedure of the subgame consistent solution can be identified analytically under different optimality principles. Demonstration of the use of the technique for specific optimality principles is shown with an explicitly solvable game. For the first time, analytically tractable solutions of cooperative stochastic differential games with subgame consistency are derived.     

Complex genetic evolution of artificial self‐replicators in cellular automata

It is widely believed that evolutionary dynamics of artificial self‐replicators realized in cellular automata (CA) are limited in diversity and adaptation. Contrary to this view, we show that complex genetic evolution may occur within simple CA. The evolving self‐replicating loops (“evoloops”) we investigate exhibit significant diversity in macro‐scale morphologies and mutational biases, undergoing nontrivial genetic adaptation by maximizing colony density and enhancing sustainability against other species. Nonmutable subsequences enable genetic operations that alter fitness differentials and promote long‐term evolutionary exploration. These results demonstrate a unique example of genetic evolution hierarchically emerging from local interactions between elements much smaller than individual replicators. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 10: 33–39, 2004