Crime and punishment: Does it pay to punish?

Crime is the result of a rational distinctive balance between the benefits and costs of an illegal act. This idea was proposed by Becker more than forty years ago (Becker (1968) [1]). In this paper, we simulate a simple artificial society, in which agents earn fixed wages and can augment (or lose) wealth as a result of a successful (or not) act of crime. The probability of apprehension depends on the gravity of the crime, and the punishment takes the form of imprisonment and fines. We study the costs of the law enforcement system required for keeping crime within acceptable limits, and compare it with the harm produced by crime. A sharp phase transition is observed as a function of the probability of punishment, and this transition exhibits a clear hysteresis effect, suggesting that the cost of reversing a deteriorated situation might be much higher than that of maintaining a relatively low level of delinquency. Besides, we analyze economic consequences that arise from crimes under different scenarios of criminal activity and probabilities of apprehension.     

英国国家科研与创新署学科交叉研究资助机制及启示

Newly established in 2018, the UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) strengthens the strategic coordination of the UK research and innovation system by bringing together seven Research Councils, Research England, and Innovate UK. Through its nine organizations, UKRI funds multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research in a number of priority areas. It also runs the Strategic Priorities Fund to support multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research in strategic areas identified by government policies as well as the Global Challenges Research Fund to promote challenge-led interdisciplinary research needed by developing countries. The UKRI makes significant efforts to engage stakeholders in the development, design, and implementation of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary programs. It has also developed a range of mechanisms to improve the evaluation of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary projects. Chinese science and innovation funding agencies could draw upon the UKRI experience from four aspects to advance interdisciplinary research in China.     

一种惩罚机制下一次性n人囚徒困境的合作性

为解决一次性n人囚徒困境中局中人如何走出困境的问题,引进了背叛惩罚函数及其严厉度和参与人的背叛愿意度等概念,并用数学论证法证明了如下结果:(1)参与人的背叛愿意度都不超过1.(2)背叛愿意度越大,这个参与人越愿意背叛;(3)背叛愿意度为0零时,这个参与人是否背叛其赢得一样;(4)当背叛愿意度取负数时,其绝对值越大,参与人的合作积极性越大.得到博弈结果的判定法:(1)计算各参与人的背叛愿意度.(2)若至少有一个参与人愿意背叛,则全体参与人都背叛.(3)若全体参与人都愿意合作,则合作成功.例子表明,本结果在理论上可有效地解决中局中人如何走出困境和在给定惩罚机制下博弈结果的预测问题.     

A flexible multicriteria decision-making methodology to support the strategic management of Science,Technology and Innovation research funding programs

Research funding programs are a policy instrument utilized by governments to influence the innovation process. They are usually elaborated, launched and managed by research funding agencies. In order to select the most adequate research projects, agencies often rely on the peer review process.This paper introduces a methodology to support funding decisions based on the peer review process. The methodology involves the use of a multicriteria decision model to support the assessment, evaluation, prioritization and selection of applications, under a multi-step decision-making process, which fits into a strategic management cycle within the agency. The Multiattribute Value Theory, being considered under a Value Focused Thinking approach, provides a basis for the construction of the multicriteria decision model. The good practices in peer review and also a logical framework for program management are considered by the methodology.A pilot study, presented in the paper, involved a retrospective implementation of a peer review process in the context of a program launched by the Ministry for Science, Technology, Innovations and Communications and the National Council of Technological and Scientific Development, in Brazil. The methodology allowed a clear distinction of roles. The agency staff in the role of decision-makers was responsible for making value judgments on behalf of the agency. The experts, in the role of committee members and ad hoc reviewers, contributed with their expertise by providing objective assessments. Such assessments served as a basis for evaluating the applications, characterizing the possible portfolios, and can be considered as data in future program evaluation studies.     

Pricing peer-produced services: Quality,capacity, and competition issues

Peer production has played an important role in the economics of Web 2.0 related services in which user participation and contribution become the main driving dynamics. However, the quality of peer-produced services is uncertain because of inherently decentralized and heterogeneous participants. In the paper, utilizing reliability and game theoretic models, we develop a QoS measure and pricing schemes for this emerging type of service under various market structures. Our results suggest that a monopolistic platform provider has no incentive to offer multiple quality classes of service. Two competing platform providers may offer identical service contracts but still receive non-negative profit. If they offer heterogeneous service contracts, the provider with the lower quality service may provide higher quality than he advertises. This research contributes to the literature with a number of unique and interesting implications for the issues of service contract design, capacity planning, and market interactions for operations of community-based or peer-produced services.     

Evolutionary snowdrift game incorporating costly punishment in structured populations

The role of punishment and the effects of a structured population in promoting cooperation are important issues. Within a recent model of snowdrift game (SG) incorporating a costly punishing strategy (P), we study the effects of a population connected through a square lattice. The punishers, who carry basically a cooperative (C) character, are willing to pay a cost α$\alpha$ so as to punish a non-cooperative (D) opponent by β$\beta$. Depending on α$\alpha$, β$\beta$, the cost-to-benefit ratio r$r$ in SG, and the initial conditions, the system evolves into different phases that could be homogeneous or inhomogeneous. The spatial structure imposes geometrical constraint on how one agent is affected by neighboring agents. Results of extensive numerical simulations, both for the steady state and the dynamics, are presented. Possible phases are identified and discussed, and isolated phases in the r–β$r\text{–}\beta$ space are identified as special local structures of strategies that are stable due to the lattice structure. In contrast to a well-mixed population where punishers are suppressed due to the cost of punishment, the altruistic punishing strategy can flourish and prevail for appropriate values of the parameters, implying an enhancement in cooperation by imposing punishments in a structured population. The system could evolve to a phase corresponding to the coexistence of C, D, and P strategies at some particular payoff parameters, and such a phase is absent in a well-mixed population. The pair approximation, a commonly used analytic approach, is extended from a two-strategy system to a three-strategy system. We show that the pair approximation can, at best, capture the numerical results only qualitatively. Due to the improper way of including spatial correlation imposed by the lattice structure, the approximation does not give the frequencies of C, D, and P accurately and fails to give the homogeneous AllD and AllP phases.     

The Italian way: Accreditation and continuous quality improvement in clinical laboratories

 The transition from quality assurance of the analytical phase to the quality management of total testing in clinical laboratories is still at an early stage. But it has begun. Accreditation through voluntary, educational and professional schemes, like the Clinical Pathology Accreditation scheme, is a useful tool for following defined standards of practice and having these independently confirmed on the basis of a peer review. Approved clinical laboratories can obtain a hallmark of performance and offer reassurance to users of their services. However, accreditation does not guarantee an error-free service; it is not the final step, but an important stage in the improvement process. Quality is a journey and continuous quality improvement is the paradigm for better addressing our efforts to satisfy customers' expectations for the desired health outcomes related to a high-quality laboratory service.     

The survival of inefficient and efficient norms: Equilibria with and without meta-norms in a repeated norm enforcing game

ABSTRACT

Although meta-norms have been considered as the key to sustaining cooperation norms, this study argues that the meta-norms also facilitate the survival of inefficient norms. The opportunistic norm violation strategy is proposed as an alternative mechanism to motivate costly punishments. A repeated norm enforcing game, in which the externality of the normative action can be negative or positive, is analyzed. This game is equivalent to a social dilemma if the externality is large enough. The ranges of externalities that support tit-for-tat, meta-norm, and opportunism equilibria are compared. The meta-norm equilibrium has the highest stability; however, it can persist in negative externalities. Finally, the opportunism equilibrium is more stable than the tit-for-tat equilibrium, but it breaks down when the externality is small.