Dynamic Strategic Pricing and Speed of Diffusion

Defining speed of diffusion as the amount of time it takes to get from one penetration level to a higher one, we introduce a dynamic model in which we study the link between pricing policy, speed of diffusion, and number of competitors in the market. Our analysis shows that, in the case of strategic (oligopolistic) competition, the speed of diffusion has an important influence on the optimal pricing policy. In particular, we find that higher speeds of diffusion create an incentive to strategically interacting firms to lower their prices.     

Action learning versus strategy learning

This article seeks to ascertain whether the strategy‐learning model of Hanaki, Sethi, Erev, and Peterhansl (2003) better accounts for observed behavior than do the various action‐learning models. It does so by measuring the goodness‐of‐fit of the models' predictions against published experimental results for such games as Coordination, Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chicken. The fit is measured via the mean squared deviation (MSD) between the observed behavior and the one predicted by the model. The results show that, for Chicken, the strategy‐learning model fits the observed data much better than do the action‐learning models. The best action‐learning model, on the other hand, fits the observed data well in Coordination. Overall, the strength of the strategy‐learning model is best shown in games where alternations between the two stage‐game Nash equilibria are often observed in the laboratory experiments. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 9: 41–50, 2004     

Noninferior Nash Strategies for Multi-Team Systems

This paper is concerned with the optimization of systems that are controlled by several teams of decision makers. The decision makers within each team cooperate for the benefit of their team. On the other hand, the teams compete among themselves in order to achieve an objective that relates to the overall performance of the system. An approach that merges concepts from team theory and game theory for dealing with such systems and a solution called the noninferior Nash strategy are introduced. This multi-team solution provides a new framework for analyzing hierarchically controlled systems so as to address complicated coordination problems among the decision makers. The properties of the noninferior Nash solution in static multi-team systems are investigated and necessary conditions for its existence are derived. Analytical expressions for the noninferior Nash strategies are derived for a class of linear-quadratic static multi-team games. In order to deal with the issue of nonuniqueness of the solution, the concept of a noninferior Nash strategy with a team leader is introduced. Several examples are presented to illustrate the results.     

基于指数分布的进化策略

典型的进化策略受自然进化过程的启发而成为求解全局优化问题的重要方法。传统的ES变异算子作为一个主要的进化技术是建立在正态分布的随机变量基础上的，本文提出了基于指数分布的进化策略由于采用了新的变异算子有效地减少了产生探试解的成本，从而优于传统的进化策略。     

Stabilizing an uncertain production system

Consider a production system that consists ofm machines each of which can produce parts ofn types. When machinek is used, it produces a part of typei with probabilityp _ki . Requests arrive for parts, one at a time. With probability _i an arriving request is for a part of typei. The requests must be served without waiting. Thus, if a requested part is not available, it must be produced. We find necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a strategy (a choice of the machines to be used) which makes the inventory of parts stable and we provide such a strategy.Two variations of this model are also considered: the case of batch arrivals of requests, and that of a system where the requests can be queued.     

Tactical problems involving uncertain actions

The purpose of this paper is to solve anm-silent versusn-silent duel with arbitrary accuracy functionsP andQ which are continuously differentiable in [0, 1] with positive derivatives in (0, 1) and such thatP(0)=Q(0)=0,P(1)(0, 1),Q(1)(0, 1). The game can be interpreted as a game in which the players know only that the numbers of their actions have binomial distribution.Part of this paper was written during the author's stay at the Institute of Statistics and Mathematical Economics, University of Karlsruhe, FRG. The author wishes to thank Prof. S. Trybua, Technical University of Wrocaw, Poland, for helpful discussion in preparing the paper and Prof. D. Pallaschke, University of Karlsruhe, FRG, for help in preparing the numerical example.     

Current mass spectrometry strategies for selenium speciation in dietary sources of high-selenium

This document reviews the most relevant mass spectrometry approaches to selenium (Se) speciation in high-Se food supplements in terms of qualitative and quantitative Se speciation and Se-containing species identification, with special reference to high-Se yeast, garlic, onions and Brazil nuts. Important topics such as complexity of Se speciation in these materials and the importance of combining Se-specific detection and molecule-specific determination of the particular species of this element in parallel with chromatography, to understand their nutritional role and cancer preventive properties are critically discussed throughout. The versatility and potential of mass spectrometric detection in this field are clearly demonstrated. Although great advances have been achieved, further developments are required, especially if speciatedcertified reference materials (CRMs) are to be produced for validation of measurements of target Se-containing species in Se-food supplements.     

Computation of suboptimal randomized strategies for steering the random motion of a point under partial observation

Consider the random motion in the plane of a pointM, whose velocityv=(v ₁,v ₂) is perturbed by an ²-valued Gaussian white noise. Only noisy nonlinear observations taken on the point location (state) are available toM. The velocityv is of the formv(y)= _u (u ₁,u ₂) _y (du), wherey denotes the value of the observed signal,U is the range of the velocity, and, for eachy, _y is a probability measure on (U). Using the available observations, the pointM wishes to steer itself into a given target set by choosing a randomized strategy ={ _y :y ²}. Sufficient conditions on weak optimal randomized strategies are derived. An algorithm for computing weak suboptimal randomized strategies is suggested, and the strategies are computed for a variety of cases.This work was partially supported by a grant from Control Data.     

Mixed strategy solutions forN-person quadratic games

Mixed strategy -equilibrium points are given forN-person games with cost functions consisting of quadratic, bilinear, and linear terms and strategy spaces consisting of closed balls in Hilbert spaces. The results are applied to linear-quadratic differential games with no information and quadratic integral constraints on the control functions.This work was supported by a Commonwealth of Australia, Postgraduate Research Award.