不完全契约下政府实施公共品负担对私人部门行为选择影响机制研究

政府部门往往会承担公共品负担提高社会公共福利和满足社会诉求,私人部门在PPP项目建设运营中会采取机会主义行为损害政府部门利益和降低社会福利。本文运用演化博弈分析私人部门的机会主义行为演化机制。通过模型分析可得,当政府补贴系数低于一定程度时,私人部门采取机会主义行为的概率随着公共品负担强度的增加而增加;当政府实施公共品负担小于一定强度时,私人部门会随着政府补贴程度提高而不采取机会主义行为,而当公共品负担强度大于一定值时,政府补贴政策正相关性就被严重削弱;私人部门占据更多的利益分配比重,更有倾向采取机会主义行为。根据研究结果,政府部门应增强契约精神,公共品负担下,政府补贴并不能有效降低机会主义行为,而应完善监管机制和提升私人部门对项目收益的信心。     

Free trial or no free trial: Optimal software product design with network effects

A common business strategy to promote product adoption in software industry is to provide a free trial version with limited functionalities of the commercial product to increase the installed user base. The increase of user base will lead to higher value of the software because of positive network effects. However, offering a free trial version may cannibalize some demand of the commercial software. This paper examines the tradeoff between network effects and the cannibalization effect, and aims to uncover the conditions under which firms should introduce the free trial product. We find that when network intensity is strong, it is more profitable for a software monopoly to offer free trial than to segment the market with two versions of different qualities. In addition, this paper solves the joint decision problem of finding the optimal quality for the firm’s free trial software and the optimal price of its commercial product.     

考虑投资者心理预期的投资性商品价格运行稳定性识别与反馈控制机制设计

以投资性商品的价格运行系统为研究对象,引入反映投资者心理预期的变量,对传统的蛛网模型加以改进,并据此构建非均衡市场环境下投资性商品价格运行开环系统模型,对非均衡市场环境下投资性商品市场价格运行的稳定性进行识别,在此基础上对反馈控制机制进行设计.以我国的住宅市场的价格运行系统为实证研究对象,结合历史数据对所构模型的有效性进行验证,并对未来可能出现情况进行预测.实证研究主要结论如下:第一,我国住宅市场投资者对预期收益的敏感程度以及供应商对商品前期价格的敏感程度均较高,价格运行能自发实现稳定的区域较小;第二,现有调控政策不变的情况下,我国住宅市场价格正向偏离稳定区域的程度将减小;第三,若政府从影响投资者心理预期的角度入手对我国住宅市场价格波动进行干预,希望我国住宅市场的价格运行能以最快的速度趋于稳态,则设计反馈控制机制时,应重视投资者对商品价格未来的心理预期受商品历史价格的影响程度远高于受市场供需的影响程度这一现象.     

居民家庭耐用消费品的消费时机选择:实物期权的方法

针对当前居民家庭消费的特点，为了合理地选择耐用消费品的最佳购买时机，本分析耐用品的价格和性能具有实物期权的属性，建立了一个关于“性价比”变量的随机微分方程，并且求出了购买时机临界值的解析公式。最后对日常生活中发生的购买时间现象给予了解释。     

名优产品与劣质产品，孰优孰劣——消费品市场的博弈分析

由于信息不对称,买者通过逆向选择,在消费品市场上形成’伪劣产品”驱逐“名优产品”,类似于货币史上“劣币驱逐良币”,从而伪劣产品泛滥,而在信息畅通的情况下,消费者的选择是购买名优产品,不买劣质产品,厂商的选择是生产名优产品,或者长期生产劣质产品,但产品无人问津.     

Condorcet Winners for Public Goods

In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the majority rule winner. We develop fast algorithms for interesting cases with nice combinatorial structures. We show that the computing problem and the decision problem in the general case, where the number of public facilities is more than one and is considered part of the input size, are all NP-hard. Finally, we discuss majority rule decision making for related models.     

考虑合同保质期的快速失效药品的二级供应链库存策略研究

医院药品对保质期和服务水平有非常高的要求,同时,药品的库存空间在医药库存中也有重要影响。首先针对快速失效的医药药品考虑了医药库存的合同保质期以及库存空间约束,同时考虑医院库存以及制造商库存,基于经济订货批量模型和经济生产批量模型建立了二级供应链的医药库存模型,然后用MATLAB软件求解了模型最优解,并对一些重要参数进行了敏感性分析。研究发现,合同保质期对医院订购批量、制造商生产批量和总库存成本有一定的影响,其中对于制造商的生产批量以及医院的库存成本影响较大。如果不考虑合同保质期的约束,将会对总库存成本带来更大损失。     

基于排队的两类顾客易逝品库存控制策略研究

本文采用排队理论在面向两类顾客需求的环境下讨论易逝品库存排队系统控制策略问题。首先刻画面向两类顾客服务且具有马尔科夫结构的易逝品库存系统排队模型,获得库存水平状态的稳态概率分布以及作为库存成本控制的系统稳态性能指标。接下来,构建库存控制成本函数及考虑服务水平约束的库存控制优化模型,设计了改进的遗传算法。最后,数值算例揭示出系统参数的敏感性和相应的管理启示。     

Emergence of cooperation in spatial public goods game with conditional participation

Conditional interactions are common in both human and animal societies. To understand the impacts of this feature on the evolution of cooperation, we propose a modified public goods game combined with conditional interactions in terms of the aspiration payoffs. Through simulations, we find that the function of the fraction of cooperators and the synergy factor is non-monotonic. This indicates that a large synergy factor is not always in favor of the promotion of cooperation. In addition, for a high aspiration, the typical coexistence state of cooperators and defectors could disappear, and the system demonstrates a sharp transition from the complete defection state to the complete cooperation state as the synergy factor increases. Furthermore, an interesting critical phenomenon is found in a finite system, i.e., the system can randomly evolve into a complete defection state or a complete cooperation state. An explanation of these evolutionary outcomes is provided in this paper, which is in agreement with the simulation results.     

MARINE PROTECTED AREAS IN THE HIGH SEAS AND THEIR IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL FISHING AGREEMENTS

Abstract Marine protected areas (MPAs) are gaining momentum as tools within fisheries management. Although many studies have been conducted to their use and potential, only few authors have considered their use in the High Seas. In this paper, we investigate the effects of fish growth enhancing MPAs on the formation of regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) for highly migratory fish stocks. We argue that in absence of enforcement MPAs constitute a weakest‐link public good, which can only be realized if everyone agrees. We combine this notion with a game theoretic model of RFMO formation to derive potentially stable RFMOs with and without MPAs. We find that MPAs generally increase the parameter range over which RFMOs are stable, and that they increase stability in a number of cases as compared to the case without MPAs. They do not necessarily induce a fully cooperative solution among all fishing nations. In summary, results of this paper suggest a positive role for MPAs in the High Seas.