基于CSCW的协同编著系统的设计

讨论了计算机支持的协同工作(CSCW)的主要技术，其中重点讨论了协同编著系统设计中的并发控制技术，指出了其与传统的并发控制技术的区别。根据CSCW的基本原理设计出了一个基于Browse／Server结构的协同编著系统的系统模型。该系统模型比传统的模型更加方便了用户之间通过Internet的浏览器进行协作。     

技术创新与增长期权定价

本采用了净现值(NPV)和实物期权定价方法对一个实际的MMDS的发射放大器项目进行了定价，并对两种方法定价的结果进行了分析和对比。由于实物期权方法定价的结果包含项目中的增长期权和放弃期权的价值，因而实物期权方法定价的结果比NPV方法定价的结果更合理和更高。     

On the Convenience to Form Coalitions or Partnerships in Simple Games

A partnership in a cooperative game is a coalition that possesses an internal structure and, simultaneously, behaves as an individual member. Forming partnerships leads to a modification of the original game which differs from the quotient game that arises when one or more coalitions are actually formed. In this paper, the Shapley value is used to discuss the convenience to form either coalitions or partnerships. To this end, the difference between the additive Shapley value of the partnership in the partnership game and the Shapley alliance value of the coalition, and also between the corresponding value of the internal and external players, are analysed. Simple games are especially considered. Research partially supported by Grant BFM 2003-01314 of the Science and Technology Spanish Ministry and the European Regional Development Fund.     

Sufficient optimality conditions and duality in vector optimization with invex-convexlike functions

We prove the Kuhn-Tucker sufficient optimality condition, the Wolfe duality, and a modified Mond-Weir duality for vector optimization problems involving various types of invex-convexlike functions. The class of such functins contains many known generalized convex functions. As applications, we demonstrate that, under invex-convexlikeness assumptions, the Pontryagin maximum principle is a sufficient optimality condition for cooperative differential games. The Wolfe duality is established for these games.The author is indebted to the referees and Professor W. Stadler for valuable remarks and comments, which have been used to revise considerably the paper.     

Strong,large distance impurity dipole interaction in KNbO3 single crystals

It is found that the unrelaxed impurity dipoles can arrange themselves linearly in the structure joining each other end-to-end in pseudocubic [110] direction at the tetragonal to the orthorhombic phase transition. It is shown that this alignment precedes the domain formation at the phase transition, which implies quick movements of the dipoles in the structure, and a strong dipolar interaction. The experiments with the application of dc fields to the crystals showed that the dipolar interaction becomes stronger with the field. The dipoles can see each other across the existing domain walls implying the large distance nature of the interaction. The observation of impurity clusters arranged in pseudocubic [110] direction confirmed the large distance nature of the interaction. It is concluded that this strong, large distance interaction is very interesting in as much as such an interaction of dipoles forms the basis of ferroelectricity.     

技术不确定环境下新产品策略的设计应用

技术的动态发展和企业间的竞争对企业新产品策略有很大影响,直接决定新产品的引进周期。本文在产业技术动态变化的随机环境下构建随机动态规划模型,关注产业技术进步、投资成本和产品市场竞争等影响因素,探讨企业进行新产品引进的周期选择,对新产品引进的周期和质量决策进行方法设计和应用举例。利用随机动态规划模型得出新产品引进的最优时间周期,用算例分析技术进步和产品研发成本对企业引进周期策略的影响,采取策略迭代的方法进行求解,发现技术进步较快时企业的新产品引进步伐也较快,研发成本的提高使企业的新产品引入步伐降低。     

Cooperative games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in the marketplace

Two games of interacting between a coalition of players in a marketplace and the residual players acting there are discussed, along with two approaches to fair imputation of gains of coalitions in cooperative games that are based on the concepts of the Shapley vector and core of a cooperative game. In the first game, which is an antagonistic one, the residual players try to minimize the coalition's gain, whereas in the second game, which is a noncooperative one, they try to maximize their own gain as a coalition. A meaningful interpretation of possible relations between gains and Nash equilibrium strategies in both games considered as those played between a coalition of firms and its surrounding in a particular marketplace in the framework of two classes of n-person games is presented. A particular class of games of choosing partners and forming coalitions in which models of firms operating in the marketplace are those with linear constraints and utility functions being sums of linear and bilinear functions of two corresponding vector arguments is analyzed, and a set of maximin problems on polyhedral sets of connected strategies which the problem of choosing a coalition for a particular firm is reducible to are formulated based on the firm models of the considered kind.     

技术创新的激励机制研究

本通过引入激励经济学的思想来探讨解决目前我国技术创新中的激励不足问题。本从分析具体的激励模型（包括简单激励模型、多代理任务模型和自我选择模型）入手，并进行模型的推广应用，通过选择性的讨论，针对技术创新的具体问题提出激励机制设计思想和政策建议。     

Subgame Consistent Cooperative Solutions in Stochastic Differential Games

Subgame consistency is a fundamental element in the solution of cooperative stochastic differential games. In particular, it ensures that: (i) the extension of the solution policy to a later starting time and to any possible state brought about by the prior optimal behavior of the players would remain optimal; (ii) all players do not have incentive to deviate from the initial plan. In this paper, we develop a mechanism for the derivation of the payoff distribution procedures of subgame consistent solutions in stochastic differential games with transferable payoffs. The payoff distribution procedure of the subgame consistent solution can be identified analytically under different optimality principles. Demonstration of the use of the technique for specific optimality principles is shown with an explicitly solvable game. For the first time, analytically tractable solutions of cooperative stochastic differential games with subgame consistency are derived.