The least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus

This short note proves that the least square nucleolus (Ruiz et al. (1996)) and the lexicographical solution (Sakawa and Nishizaki (1994)) select the same imputation in each game with nonempty imputation set. As a consequence the least square nucleolus is a general nucleolus (Maschler et al. (1992)). Received: December 1998/Revised version: July 1999     

Size of random Galois lattices and number of closed frequent itemsets

Given a sample of binary random vectors with i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) components, that is equal to 1 (resp. 0) with probability p (resp. 1−p), we first establish a formula for the mean of the size of the random Galois lattice built from this sample, and a more complex one for its variance. Then, noticing that closed α-frequent itemsets are in bijection with closed α-winning coalitions, we establish similar formulas for the mean and the variance of the number of closed α-frequent itemsets. This can be interesting for the study of the complexity of some data mining problems such as association rule mining, sequential pattern mining and classification.     

PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION

ABSTRACT. We analyze the formation of self‐enforcing international environmental agreements under the assumption that countries announce their participation either simultaneously or sequentially. It is shown that a sequential formation process opens up possibilities for strategic behavior of countries that may lead to inferior outcomes in terms of global abatement and welfare. We then analyze whether and under which conditions a regulator like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordination and moderation, given that recommendations must be Pareto‐improving to all parties.     

A relation-algebraic approach to simple games

Simple games are a powerful tool to analyze decision-making and coalition formation in social and political life. In this paper, we present relation-algebraic models of simple games and develop relational specifications for solving some basic problems of them. In particular, we test certain fundamental properties of simple games and compute specific players and coalitions. We also apply relation algebra to determine power indices. This leads to relation-algebraic specifications, which can be evaluated with the help of the BDD-based tool Rel View after a simple translation into the tool’s programming language. In order to demonstrate the visualization facilities of Rel View we consider an example of the Catalonian Parliament after the 2003 election.     

自然灾害恢复重建的联盟博弈分析

自然灾害恢复重建的关键之一,是救济基金的筹集.论文基于联盟博弈的理论分析了国家财政拨款、地方财政拨款、红十字会等社会机构募捐三条途径,对国家财政、地方财政、社会募捐机构三方, 应筹集救济基金的比例进行了论证.使全社会对恢复重建救济基金筹集的满意度最大.     

Stabilization through taxation inn-person games

In formulating solutions forn-person cooperative games, the concept of stability has played a dominant role. Although the core concept has the strongest stability, the core of a game is often empty. In this paper, the taxation system is incorporated into our framework, so that a modified solution concept, which enjoys the stability of core, can be developed. Various formulations based on principles such astaxation proportional to income andequity after tax are given.     

网格状有向图上的部分合作对策

本文通过在有向图上每个状态结点处定义合作函数,运用Berge C的关于图匕对策中策略的概念,在网格状有向图上考察部分合作动态对策.局中人在对策进程中将采取部分合作而不是完全合作,部分合作的主要特征是每个局中人的行为是合作行动与单独行动的组合.本文合作函数的设定允许局中人加入某个联盟之后再脱离该联盟,同时给出了有向图上部分合作对策的值、最优路径的算法及示例.     

A simplified expression of the Shapley function for fuzzy game

In this paper, a simplified expression of the Shapley function for games with fuzzy coalition is proposed, which can be regarded as the generalization of Shapley functions defined in some particular games with fuzzy coalition. The simplified expression of the Shapley function is compared with two definitions established by Butnariu, Tsurumi et al. A conclusion is drawn that the simplified expression of the Shapley function is equivalent to Butnariu’s definition when characteristic function is a game with proportional values, and is equivalent to Tsurumi’s definition when characteristic function is a game with Choquet integral forms. Furthermore, from an angle of interaction between two participation levels, the properties of the two games defined by Butnariu and Tsurumi are respectively studied.     

积分通用计划下零售商的联盟与利润分配

会员积分策略如今已经成为零售商普遍的促销手段,许多行业的零售商形成同业联盟或异业联盟,利用积分通用计划来提高业绩。在积分通用计划的背景下,考虑到零售商各自的促销与联盟之间零售商的竞争,本文旨在研究同业联盟零售商之间的积分转换比例与促销水平决策问题,使联盟总利润最大化,并在此基础上利用积分成本共担机制解决集中决策下利润分配不合理的问题。通过数值算例验证了所得结论的重要性,为零售商进行联盟合作伙伴的选择提供了参考意见。