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Marzena Filipowicz-Chomko Rafa Mierzwiak Marcin Nowak Ewa Roszkowska Tomasz Wachowicz 《Entropy (Basel, Switzerland)》2021,23(6)
Negotiation scoring systems are fundamental tools used in negotiation support to facilitate parties searching for negotiation agreement and analyzing its efficiency and fairness. Such a scoring system is obtained in prenegotiation by implementing selected multiple criteria decision-aiding methods to elicit the negotiator’s preferences precisely and ensure that the support is reliable. However, the methods classically used in the preference elicitation require much cognitive effort from the negotiators, and hence, do not prevent them from using heuristics and making simple errors that result in inaccurate scoring systems. This paper aims to develop an alternative tool that allows scoring the negotiation offers by implementing a sorting approach and the reference set of limiting profiles defined individually by the negotiators in the form of complete packages. These limiting profiles are evaluated holistically and verbally by the negotiator. Then the fuzzy decision model is built that uses the notion of increasing the preference granularity by introducing a series of limiting sub-profiles for corresponding sub-categories of offers. This process is performed automatically by the support algorithm and does not require any additional preferential information from the negotiator. A new method of generating reference fuzzy scores to allow a detailed assignment of any negotiation offer from feasible negotiation space to clusters and sub-clusters is proposed. Finally, the efficient frontier and Nash’s fair division are used to identify the recommended packages for negotiation in the bargaining phase. This new approach allows negotiators to obtain economically efficient, fair, balanced, and reciprocated agreements while minimizing information needs and effort. 相似文献
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We investigate a newsvendor-type retailer sourcing problem under demand uncertainty who has the option to source from multiple suppliers. The suppliers’ manufacturing costs are private information. A widely used mechanism to find the least costly supplier under asymmetric information is to use a sealed-bid reverse auction. We compare the combinations of different simple auction formats (first- and second-price) and risk sharing supply contracts (push and pull) under full contract compliance, both for risk-neutral and risk-averse retailer and suppliers. We show the superiority of a first-price push auction for a risk-neutral retailer. However, only the pull contracts lead to supply chain coordination. If the retailer is sufficiently risk-averse, the pull is preferred over the push contract. If suppliers are risk-averse, the first-price push auction remains the choice for the retailer. Numerical examples illustrate the allocation of benefits between the retailer and the (winning) supplier for different number of bidders, demand uncertainty, cost uncertainty, and degree of risk-aversion. 相似文献
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The traditional hypothesis of “rationality” is far from perfect. Models of fairness solely based on consequence cannot explain why the same consequence of an action is perceived and reciprocated differently. A reciprocity model which accounts for both consequence and its underlying intention is presented in this paper to illustrate the effect of intention in a traditional dyadic channel where one supplier plays a Stackelberg-like game with one retailer. This research aims to investigate how reciprocity may affect the members’ decisions and the channel’s coordination. In this study, two scenarios are discussed: (1) the retailer has a preference for reciprocity while the supplier does not and (2) both the retailer and the supplier have a preference for reciprocity. Results for acrimonious supply chain (γμ>1) and harmonious supply chain (γμ?1) are analyzed. Furthermore, we derive equilibria under the two scenarios and prove the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibria. The results show that intention plays an important role in decision making of the supply chain and will significantly change the equilibria. Moreover, an acrimonious supply chain can be coordinated with a simple wholesale-price contract under certain conditions, which can never happen in a traditional channel. A harmonious supply chain, however, cannot be coordinated in any way. 相似文献
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Pricing and volume discounting for a dominant retailer with uncertain manufacturing cost information
A product costs the manufacturer c/unit to produce; the retailer sells it at p/unit to the consumers. The retail-market demand volume V varies with p according to a given demand curve Dp. How would or should the “players” (i.e., the manufacturer and the retailer) set their prices? In contrast to many studies that assume a dominant manufacturer implementing the “manufacturer-Stackelberg” (“[mS]”) game, this paper examines how a dominant retailer should operate when his knowledge of c is imperfect. We first derive optimal decisions (some of them counter-intuitive) for the dominant retailer when he is restricted to choosing between [rS] (retailer-Stackelberg) and [mS]. Second, we propose a “reverse quantity discount” scheme that the dominant retailer (i.e., the downstream player) can offer to the manufacturer (note that the standard discount scheme is offered by the upstream player). We show that this discounting scheme is quite effective compared to the considerably more complicated though nevertheless theoretically optimal “menu of contracts.” We also reveal a largely overlooked function of discounting; i.e., discounting enables an “ignorant” but dominant player to usurp the earnings attributable to the knowledge of the dominated player. Finally, we also show that discounting works well when the demand curve is linear, but becomes ineffective when the demand curve is iso-elastic – a result echoing the conclusions of some earlier related works. 相似文献
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Xiuli HeMoutaz Khouja 《European Journal of Operational Research》2011,214(1):53-66
Supply chain coordination has become critical to firms as increased pressure is placed on them to improve performance. We evaluate the performance of Push, Pull, and Advance-purchase discount (APD) contracts in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain where one or both firms have a satisficing objective of maximizing the probability of achieving a target profit. We identify the resulting operational modes of the supply chain and potential conflicts over the preferred contracts under the Push, Pull, and APD contracts. When both firms are satisficing, conflict over the preferred contract arises when the manufacturer has an ambitious profit target or the retailer has a low profit target. We show that the Push contract can result in a large decrease in the expected profit of a risk-neutral manufacturer when the retailer maximizes the probability of achieving her maximum expected profit. We find that a modified buy-back and profit guarantee contracts can provide significant Pareto improvement over Push or APD contracts when the manufacturer is risk-neutral and the retailer is satisficing, while revenue-sharing contracts cannot. In contrast, revenue sharing and modified buy-back contracts are Pareto dominant under certain conditions when the manufacturer is satisficing and the retailer is risk-neutral. 相似文献
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文章以一个风险厌恶销售商与风险中性供应商所组成的两级供应链为背景,以条件风险价值(CVaR)和期望利润的加权平均作为销售商的决策目标,对期权契约下销售商的订购策略及供应链协调问题进行了研究,并对比分析了销售商以CVaR为目标时的情形。在给出销售商在不同风险厌恶程度下的最优订购策略后,文章进一步给出了供应链相应的协调条件,并分析了此时期权权利金,销售商的风险厌恶程度和期望利润权重等参数对供销双方收益的影响,发现“利润-CVaR”法下销售商的风险厌恶程度对供销双方利润的影响与CVaR法下的情况有所不同,但权利金依然起到了分配整体供应链利润的作用,且销售商期望利润权重的增加会降低自身收益水平而提高供应商利润。最后,文章通过数值模拟的方式对上述结论进行了验证。 相似文献
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在面临相同随机市场需求的情况下,本文对期权契约中的看涨期权与看跌期权契约进行了对比分析,以期为决策者在实际采购活动中选择不同类型的期权契约时提供决策依据。通过模型建立与求解分析,本文得出了销售商接受期权契约时,契约参数需要满足的条件及相应的订购策略;并进一步得出了两种期权契约下,供应链达到协调状态时的具体条件,分析了此时契约参数对供销双方利润的影响,继而给出了两种期权契约的适用范围以及供销双方的契约选择偏好。在此基础上,本文还给出了不同期权契约下,供销双方各自利润均不低于其自身保留利润时契约参数的取值范围,并证明了两种期权契约均可有效提高销售商的利润水平。最后,本文通过算例对上述结论进行了验证。 相似文献
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This paper shows how a manufacturer may use an incentive contract with a distributor under a VMI arrangement to gain market share. The manufacturer promises a distributor lower inventory levels in exchange for efforts by the distributor to convert potential lost sales due to stockouts to backorders. Data gathered from a third party provider of information services are then used to illustrate that this incentive arrangement may, at least implicitly, be employed in industry. Our data estimations show that when a manufacturer and distributor are operating under a VMI arrangement, lower inventory at the distributor is associated with a higher conversion rate of lost sales stockouts to backorders. 相似文献