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Home-grown values and incentive compatible auction design 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
E. Elisabet Rutström 《International Journal of Game Theory》1998,27(3):427-441
The behavioral properties of several auctions designed to elicit individual valuations for an object are studied using controlled
laboratory experiments. Our experiments lead us to conclude that there are some behavioral differences between alternative incentive-compatible institutions for eliciting home-grown values, contrary
to the theoretical expectation that these institutions are isomorphic. These results are consistent with earlier experimental
results using induced values. The most important finding is that English auctions appear to elicit lower bids than Vickrey
auctions, after controlling for observable socio-economic characteristics. Moreover, English auction bids also exhibit significantly
less residual variance and may be sensitive to the number of rival bidders. It appears that the real-time learning allowed
in the English auction significantly affects subject behavior. We also find that values elicited with the Becker, DeGroot
and Marshak institution differ from those in both English and Vickrey auctions.
Received November 1993/Final version May 1995 相似文献
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We consider pricing schemes for matching customers and providers on double-sided markets for electronic services. While existing second-best solutions are incentive compatible, the associated payment functions are difficult to implement in real-world settings. Based on the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) and the -pricing mechanism, we propose two straightforward payment schemes that offer a practical alternative to the second-best solution. Our experiments provide evidence that the VCG payments fail to implement incentive compatibility. This failure is due to the interdependency of the participants’ utilities. 相似文献
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