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1.
Some properties of the bilevel programming problem 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
J. F. Bard 《Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications》1991,68(2):371-378
The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the difficulties accompanying the development of efficient algorithms for solving the bilevel programming problem (BLPP). We begin with a pair of examples showing that, even under the best of circumstances, solutions may not exist. This is followed by a proof that the BLPP is NP-hard.This work was partially supported by a grant from the Advanced Research Program of the Texas Higher Education Coordinating Board. 相似文献
2.
We consider the Stackelberg problem corresponding to a two-player game in which one of the two players has the leadership in playing the game. We present a general approach for approximating the considered hierarchical programming problem by a sequence of two-level optimization problems. From a practical point of view, we also give some results for asymptotically Stackelberg approximating sequences and for problems with perturbed constraints.This paper is based upon results first presented at Journées Fermat: Mathematics for Optimization, Toulouse, France, May 1985. 相似文献
3.
P. Marcotte 《Mathematical Programming》1986,34(2):142-162
4.
Piotr Frąckiewicz 《Physics letters. A》2018,382(48):3463-3469
The Li–Du–Massar quantum duopoly model is one of the generally accepted quantum game schemes. It has applications in a wide range of duopoly problems. Our purpose is to study Stackelberg's duopoly with incomplete information in the quantum domain. The result of Lo and Kiang has shown that the correlation of players' quantities caused by the quantum entanglement enhances the first-mover advantage in the game. Our work demonstrates that there is no first-mover advantage if the players' actions are maximally correlated. Furthermore, we proved that the second mover gains a higher equilibrium payoff than the first one. 相似文献
5.
研究由一个供应商和一个零售组成的二级供应链系统在碳税政策下的协调问题.对于市场需求率为时变函数且依赖于当前库存水平和销售价格的情形,建立分散式和集中式供应链决策模型.比较两种模型得出供应商和零售商合作能够提高供应链的整体利润但是也会产生更多的碳排放.分别利用批发价格契约和两部收费契约协调分散式决策模型得出供应链协调的条件.最后通过数值算例验证理论结果并分析碳税单价对供应链在两部收费契约下实现协调的影响. 相似文献
6.
本文研究制造商承担企业社会责任时,竞争市场下供应链的均衡价格策略。通过Stackelberg博弈模型,探讨供应链成员的风险规避程度、竞争市场的需求波动性和竞争市场的需求相关性以及制造商企业社会责任水平对供应链均衡策略的影响。研究表明,在制造商承担企业社会责任时,风险规避程度对价格策略的影响依赖于制造商企业社会责任水平的高低;竞争市场的需求波动性较大或竞争市场需求相关性较高时,制造商向下游风险规避型零售商提供较低的批发价格合约, 此时产品的市场价格降低,消费者福利增加;当制造商的生产成本较低时,承担越高的企业社会责任导致消费者福利增加;反之,当制造商的生产成本较高时,消费者福利总是减少。 相似文献
7.
RFID技术的应用在有效降低商品库存损耗率的同时,也增加了供应链企业的运营成本,尤其是具有资金压力的供应链中小企业。在零售商具有资金约束的二级供应链下分析RFID技术的应用对资金约束供应链绩效的影响,通过构建贸易信贷下基于批发价合同的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比采用RFID前后资金约束供应链成员的均衡决策及期望收益,探讨了该供应链采用RFID的必要条件。结果显示当RFID标签成本低于某个阈值,或RFID库存损耗恢复率高于某个阈值时,供应链成员会选择采用RFID。此外,当RFID单位标签成本或零售商标签成本分摊系数较低,或RFID库存损耗恢复率较高时,制造商会提供比不采用RFID时更高的批发价;在采用RFID的条件下,零售商订购数量低于不采用RFID时的数量。通过设计收益分享契约实现了采用RFID时资金约束供应链的协调。 相似文献
8.
E-闭环供应链(E-CLSC)管理须有科学的定价与服务决策支撑。针对集中和分散回收模式,构建电商平台主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究E-CLSC定价与平台服务决策。通过对产品销售价格、平台服务水平等均衡策略分析,揭示回收主体投资有效性、回收转移价格等对E-CLSC均衡策略影响。研究表明:集中回收模式优于分散回收模式;在分散回收模式下,若回收主体投资有效性相同,制造商、平台均偏好制造商回收模式;平台回收与第三方回收模式相比,产品销售价格、平台服务水平相同,前者回收渠道效率较高;平台回收模式下,单位佣金与回收转移价格负相关,产品销售价格、平台服务水平、废旧产品回收率均与回收转移价格无关;若回收主体投资有效性差异程度较大,制造商回收模式并非总是最优的,回收主体投资有效性差异显著影响产品销售价格、回收渠道效率、平台服务水平和E-CLSC各成员利润。上述结论通过数值仿真进行了验证。 相似文献
9.
Two kinds of vertical cooperative advertising program are considered in a distribution channel constituted by a manufacturer and a retailer, where the manufacturer pays part of
the retailer’s advertising costs. In the first participation scheme, the manufacturer chooses his/her advertising participation
rate in the retailer’s advertising effort and then each player determines the advertising effort that maximizes his/her profit.
In the second scheme, the retailer chooses the manufacturer’s participation rate and then the manufacturer determines the
advertising efforts of both players with the objective of maximizing the manufacturer’s profit. Each participation scheme
corresponds to a special Stackelberg game: the manufacturer is the leader of the first, while the retailer is the leader of
the second. The Stackelberg equilibrium advertising efforts and participation rate in both games are provided. Then the equilibrium
strategies of the two players in the analyzed scenarios are compared with the Nash equilibrium in the competitive framework.
Finally, the conditions which suggest a special kind of agreement to a player are analyzed.
This work was supported by the Italian Ministry of University and Research and the University of Padua. 相似文献
10.
Open-loop multilevel Stackelberg strategies in deterministic, sequential decision-making problems for continuous linear systems and quadratic criteria are developed. Characterization of the Stackelberg controls via the solution of a higher-order square-matrix-Riccati differential equation is established; also, the basic structural properties of the coefficient matrices of this differential equation are established, and the basic structural properties of its solution are inferred.This work was supported in part by the Energy Research and Development Administration, Contract No. ERDA E(49-18)-2088.on leave from the Mihailo Pupin Institute, Belgrade, Yugoslavia. 相似文献