Efficiency of Classical and Quantum Games Equilibria

Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria of classical and quantum games are investigated in the context of their Pareto efficiency. The examples of the prisoner’s dilemma, battle of the sexes and the game of chicken are studied. Correlated equilibria usually improve Nash equilibria of games but require a trusted correlation device susceptible to manipulation. The quantum extension of these games in the Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein formalism and the Frąckiewicz–Pykacz parameterization is analyzed. It is shown that the Nash equilibria of these games in quantum mixed Pauli strategies are closer to Pareto optimal results than their classical counter-parts. The relationship of mixed Pauli strategies equilibria and correlated equilibria is also studied.     

Super efficiencies or super inefficiencies? Insights from a joint computation model for slacks-based measures in DEA

The slacks-based measure (SBM) can incorporate input and output slacks that would otherwise be neglected in the classical DEA model. In parallel, the super-efficiency model for SBM (S-SBM) has been developed for the purpose of ranking SBM efficient decision-making units (DMUs). When implementing SBM in conjunction with S-SBM, however, several issues can arise. First, unlike the standard super-efficiency model, S-SBM can only solve for super-efficiency scores but not SBM scores. Second, the S-SBM model may result in weakly efficient reference points. Third, the S-SBM and SBM scores for certain DMUs may be discontinuous with a perturbation to their inputs and outputs, making it hard to interpret and justify the scores in applications and the efficiency scores may be sensitive to small changes/errors in data. Due to this discontinuity, the S-SBM model may overestimate the super-efficiency score. This paper extends the existing SBM approaches and develops a joint model (J-SBM) that addresses the above issues; namely, the J-SBM model can (1) simultaneously compute SBM scores for inefficient DMUs and super-efficiency for efficient DMUs, (2) guarantee the reference points generated by the joint model are Pareto-efficient, and (3) the J-SBM scores of a firm are continuous in the input and output space. Interestingly, the radial DEA efficiency and super-efficiency scores for a DMU are continuous in the input–output space. The J-SBM model combines the merits of the radial and SBM models (i.e., continuity and Pareto-efficiency).     

An analysis of some dual problems in multiobjective optimization (I)

In this work we study the duality for a general multiobjective optimization problem. Considering, first, a scalar problem, different duals using the conjugacy approach are presented. Starting from these scalar duals, we introduce six different multiobjective dual problems to the primal one, one depending on certain vector parameters. The existence of weak and, under certain conditions, strong duality between the primal and the dual problems is shown. Afterwards, some inclusion results for the image sets of the multiobjective dual problems (D ₁), (D _α) and (D_FL ) are derived. Moreover, we verify that the efficiency sets within the image sets of these problems coincide, but the image sets themselves do not.     

On the existence of strong Nash equilibria

This paper investigates the existence of strong Nash equilibria (SNE) in continuous and concave games. It is shown that the coalition consistency property introduced in the paper, together with concavity and continuity of payoffs, permits the existence of SNE in games with compact and convex strategy spaces. We also characterize the existence of SNE by providing necessary and sufficient conditions. We suggest an algorithm for computing SNE. The results are illustrated with applications to economies with multilateral environmental externalities and to the static oligopoly model.     

Discounted and finitely repeated minority games with public signals

We consider a repeated game where at each stage players simultaneously choose one of the two rooms. The players who choose the less crowded room are rewarded with one euro. The players in the same room do not recognize each other, and between the stages only the current majority room is publicly announced, hence the game has imperfect public monitoring. An undiscounted version of this game was considered by Renault et al. [Renault, J., Scarlatti, S., Scarsini, M., 2005. A folk theorem for minority games. Games Econom. Behav. 53 (2), 208–230], who proved a folk theorem. Here we consider a discounted version and a finitely repeated version of the game, and we strengthen our previous result by showing that the set of equilibrium payoffs Hausdorff-converges to the feasible set as either the discount factor goes to one or the number of repetition goes to infinity. We show that the set of public equilibria for this game is strictly smaller than the set of private equilibria.