Buyer behavior adaptation based on a fuzzy logic controller and prediction techniques

The current form of Web provides numerous product resources available to users. Users can rely on intelligent agents for purchase actions. These actions are taken in specific environments such as Electronic Markets (EMs). In this paper, we study the interaction process between buyers and sellers and focus on the buyer side. Each buyer has the opportunity to interact with a number of sellers trying to buy the most appropriate products. This interaction can be modeled as a finite horizon Bargaining Game (BG). In this game, players have opposite goals concerning the product price. We adopt a number of techniques in the buyer side trying to give the appropriate level of efficiency in the buyer decision process. The buyer uses a prediction mechanism in combination with the use of Fuzzy Logic (FL) theory in order to be able to predict the upcoming seller proposal and, thus, understand the seller pricing policy. Based on this, he/she can adapt his/her behavior when trying to purchase products. The buyer adaptation mechanism produces the belief that the buyer has about the seller pricing policy and a parameter that indicates his/her own pricing policy which yields the buyer offers in the upcoming rounds. Moreover, the buyer is based on FL system that derives the appropriate actions at every round of the BG. Our results show that the combination of Fuzzy Logic (FL) with the above-mentioned techniques provides an efficient decision mechanism in the buyer side that in specific scenarios outperforms an optimal stopping model.     

Negotiating wisely: Considerations based on MCDM/MAUT

Negotiation, both an art and a science, is important in business and in personal life. To negotiate intelligently, we need a strategy to help identify when, for what, and how we should negotiate. We consider a one-to-many negotiation problem such as a house-purchase process in which there is one buyer and many sellers. The alternatives are evaluated using multiple criteria, but only one criterion (such as price) is to be settled by negotiation. We use the Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) as a dynamic measure of negotiating strength, and develop a systematic quantitative iterative approach to assist in the negotiation process. We explore using simulation the efficacy of negotiating for more than one alternative at the same time. The objective of our approach is to help a negotiator achieve a good, hopefully an optimal, result effectively.     

“齐王赛马＂的Nash谈判解

“齐王赛马”是一个典型的对策论例子,本文运用对策论相关知识,求出了“齐王赛马”的Nash谈判解．同时得出结论：齐王和田忌的期望收益正好与问题的Nash谈判解一致．     

Satisfiability and completeness of protocols for electronic negotiations

Many of the existing e-negotiation support systems are built around one negotiation protocol. This effectively restricts their use to those problems and interactions that had been assumed a priori by the systems’ designers. Field and experimental studies show that the way the negotiation process is structured depends on the negotiators’ characteristics, the problem and the context in which an agreement is sought. It has also been recognized in literature that both the way a problem is represented and the solution process implemented strongly influence the results at which individual decision-makers and negotiators arrive. Building on the e-negotiation Montreal taxonomy this article proposes a more complete typology of protocols and their characteristics. It also presents the elements of a theory for the design of negotiation protocols. The proposed protocol formalism allows for the construction of models from which users can select a protocol instance that suits them and/or is appropriate for the problem at-hand. Furthermore, this formalism allows for the construction of protocols that can be modified during the user–system interactions. The paper also presents two key requirements for negotiation protocols embedded in support systems, namely their satisfiability and completeness.     

Negotiation,preferences over agreements,and the core

We analyze conditions under which negotiated agreements are efficient from the point of view of every possible coalition of negotiators. The negotiators have lexicographic preferences over agreements they reach. Their utility is the first criterion. The coalition reaching an agreement is the second criterion. In the analyzed non-cooperative discrete time bargaining game Γ the players bargain about the choice from the sets of utility vectors feasible for coalitions in a given NTU game (N, V). If Γ has a Markov perfect equilibrium, then the set of equilibrium utility vectors in Markov perfect equilibria in it equals the core of (N, V). I thank an anonymous referee, an anonymous Associate Editor, and the Editor for their comments that helped me to improve the paper. The research reported in this paper was supported by the Grant VEGA 1/1223/04 of the Ministry of Education of the Slovak Republic.     

A Bayesian priorization procedure for AHP-group decision making

This paper proposes a new priorization procedure for Analytic Hierarchy Process Group Decision Making (AHP-GDM). Unlike the methods normally employed in AHP-GDM, this process does not require intermediate filters for the actors’ initial judgements. The procedure is based on a Bayesian analysis of the problem and in general, it provides more efficient estimates than the techniques conventionally applied in the literature for AHP-GDM: aggregation of individual judgements (AIJ) and aggregation of individual priorities (AIP). The proposed procedure naturally extends to the analysis of incomplete and/or imprecise pairwise comparison matrices, enhancing realism, practicality and scope. The methodology has been illustrated by the analysis of a case study.     

Reverse auction with buyer-supplier negotiation using bi-level distributed programming

This study presents a framework for solving a sealed-bid, multi-issue, and multi-sourcing reverse auction problem in which negotiation takes place between the buyer and the suppliers during the bidding process. The problem is formulated as a bi-level distributed programming model in which the buyer is the upper level decision maker, while suppliers at the lower level make decisions independent of each other. The negotiation process between the buyer and the suppliers is facilitated via the iterative exchange of decision information between the upper and lower levels of the model. The outcome of the sealed-bid auction is determined using an algorithm designed to establish the optimum quantity allocation and delivery time at the upper level and the corresponding optimized production plans at the lower level. The feasibility of the proposed approach is demonstrated via an illustrative example.     

Bargaining with stochastic disagreement payoffs

We study a bargaining model where (i) players interim disagreement payoffs are stochastic and (ii) in any period, the proposer may postpone making an offer without losing the right to propose in the following period. This bargaining model has a generically unique perfect equilibrium payoff for each player, and the equilibrium outcome is inefficient in some cases, featuring a stochastically delayed agreement. We show that both the variation of players interim disagreement payoffs and the proposers ability to postpone making an offer without losing the right to propose are necessary for the existence of such a unique and inefficient perfect equilibrium outcome. Received April 2002/Final version April 2003     

An intelligent agent negotiation strategy in the electronic marketplace environment

E-commerce will strongly penetrate the market if coupled with appropriate technologies and mechanisms. Mobile agents may enhance the intelligence and improve the efficiency of systems in the e-marketplace. We propose a dynamic multi-lateral negotiation model and construct an efficient negotiation strategy based on a ranking mechanism that does not require a complicated rationale on behalf of the buyer agents. This strategy can be used to extend the functionality of autonomous intelligent agents, so that they quickly reach to an agreement aiming to maximise their owner’s utility. The framework proposed considers both contract and decision issues, is based on real market conditions, and has been empirically evaluated. Moreover, it is shown that in a linear framework like the one we employ, more elaborate ranking mechanisms do not necessarily improve efficiency.