A two-echelon base-stock inventory model with Poisson demand and the sequential processing of orders at the upper echelon

We consider a two-echelon inventory system with a number of non-identical, independent ‘retailers’ at the lower echelon and a single ‘supplier’ at the upper echelon. Each retailer experiences Poisson demand and operates a base stock policy with backorders. The supplier manufactures to order and holds no stock. Orders are produced, in first-come first-served sequence, with a fixed production time. The supplier therefore functions as an M/D/1 queue. We are interested in the performance characteristics (average inventory, average backorder level) at each retailer. By finding the distribution of order lead time and hence the distribution of demand during order lead time, we find the steady state inventory and backorder levels based on the assumption that order lead times are independent of demand during order lead time at a retailer. We also propose two alternative approximation procedures based on assumed forms for the order lead time distribution. Finally we provide a derivation of the steady state inventory and backorder levels which will be exact as long as there is no transportation time on orders between the supplier and retailers. A numerical comparison is made between the exact and approximate measures. We conclude by recommending an approach which is intuitive and computationally straightforward.     

A capacity reservation game for suppliers with multiple blocks of capacity

This paper studies a supplier competition model in which a buyer reserves capacity from a number of suppliers that each have multiple blocks of capacity (e.g., production or power plants). The suppliers each submit a bid that specifies a reservation price and an execution price for every block, and the buyer determines what blocks to reserve. This game involves both external competition between suppliers and internal competition between blocks from each supplier. We characterize the properties of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for the game. Such equilibria may not always exist, and we provide the conditions under which they do.     

Local stability of the Cournot solution with increasing heterogeneous competitors

In this paper we try to solve a paradox related to the results of Theocharis (1960). When the number of competitors increases the Cournot–Nash equilibrium loses stability. We relax the assumption about homogeneity in the decision mechanism and show that if we admit heterogeneity than by increasing the number of competitors the stability region on the parameters’ space may enlarge instead of shrinking.     

Capacity competition of make-to-order firms

Two make-to-order firms, each modelled as a single-server queue, compete for a common stream of (potential) customers by setting their service capacities (rates) and service prices. Each customer maximizes her expected return by getting service from a firm or by balking. We completely characterize the Nash equilibrium of the competition.     

A study of the relationship between competitiveness and technological innovation capability based on DEA models

Researchers and managers have been searching for appropriate methods to explore the relationship between technological innovation capability and competitiveness in recent years. This study attempts to find a systematic quantitative methodology to tackle this problem. In a recent survey covering 182 industrial innovative firms in China, the traditional data envelopment analysis (DEA) model was employed to analyze the data collected. The research results show that only 16% of the enterprises operate on the best-practice frontier and there are some inconsistencies between organizational innovation capability and competitiveness in many enterprises. Decreasing returns to scale were found among about 70% of the inefficient enterprises and increasing returns to scale were found among the remaining 30% of the inefficient enterprises. Thus the internal innovation harmonizing process in these enterprises is considerably inefficient. Based on the restricted ranges of the input/output factors, a multi-objective DEA projection model has also been developed in this study to provide a benchmark for auditing competitiveness. Research results further indicate that there is still much room for enterprises to improve competitiveness in situations of confining score ranges of technological innovation capability and competitiveness.     

Theory of Economic Equilibrium

Abstract

New concepts of economics such as an average demand matrix of society, strategy of a firm and consumer behaviour, and others are introduced. We give sufficient conditions for technological mapping under which there exist both the Walras equlibrium state and optimal Walras equilibrium one. We obtain the set of equations which equilibrium price vector solves. The theory of interindustry economic equilibrium is developed. The model of economy with regular interests of consumers is proposed.     

碳排放税收政策下供应链网络成员企业行为研究

针对三种碳税决策框架:分权碳税框架、集权碳税框架——固定阀值、集权碳税框架——弹性阀值,分别分析三种碳排放税收政策决策框架下供应链网络中成员企业收益的变化以及各企业间的交互行为,给出了各成员企业的均衡条件,并将其转化为变分不等式问题,建立碳排放税收政策下供应链网络成员企业博弈模型,并提出基于欧拉算法的模型求解方法。最后结合算例分析碳排放税收政策下供应链网络成员企业关于生产决策、分销决策、碳排放量的反应,研究为达到预期的环境目标,政府相关部门如何调整单位碳排放税,同时,根据成员企业相关经济指标的均衡结果,政府相关部门又如何调整碳排放的环境目标。     

Optimal pricing in a duopoly: A noncooperative differential games solution

This paper deals with a differential games model of an oligopoly ofn profit-maximizing firms competing for the same stock of customers. For the sale dynamics, it is assumed that the customers of each firm are driven away gradually by increasing product prices. Since the state variable is absent from the Hamiltonian maximizing conditions as well as from the adjoint equations, open-loop Nash solutions can be obtained. By using phase diagram analysis, for two players the behavior of the optimal pricing strategies can be characterized qualitatively. The main importance of the paper lies in the solution technique, rather than in the economic significance of the proposed model. Under the proposed assumptions, the two-point boundary-value problem resulting from the maximum principle is reduced to a terminal-value problem. It turns out that, for special salvage values of the market shares and if the planning horizon is not too short, nonmonotonic Nash-optimal price trajectories occur.Thanks are due to S. Jørgensen, A. Mehlmann, and R. Willing for helpful suggestions.     

The efficiency effects of a single market for financial services in Europe

This paper examines the potential efficiency effects of a single market for financial services in Europe. The topics covered include universal banking, the merger and acquisition process itself, cross-border ownership and management of financial institutions, and the effects of consolidation of financial institutions on the supply of relationship lending services to informationally opaque small businesses. The research reviewed here suggests that the creation of a single market for the European financial services industry is not likely to bring about strong efficiency gains and that cross-border efficiency barriers may prevent the single market from becoming a reality.     

管理者过度自信对高技术企业技术外部获取方式选择的影响研究

企业管理者的业绩预测偏差是衡量管理者是否过度自信的一个重要体现,值得关注和研究。本研究采用我国2004~2013年高技术上市公司的相关数据,应用Ordered-probit模型实证分析了管理者过度自信对高技术上市公司技术外部获取方式选择的影响。研究结果表明:我国高技术上市公司以非股权技术联盟作为首要的技术外部获取方式,公司风险投资是最后的选择;同时,研究发现:在对技术外部获取方式进行选择时,管理者过度自信的高技术上市公司选择并购优先于合资和少数持股联盟,而管理者非过度自信的高技术上市公司选择少数持股联盟优先于并购和合资。该研究方法简单、高效、合理,是企业高管提升公司管理水平和科学获取技术外部的一种新的方法选择。