The effects of resource limitation and consensual incentives on cooperation

Exploring the evolution of cooperation has been one of the most challenging topics and attracted increasing attention in various realms. Hereby, we institute an analytic model where the relationship between the common benefits and contributions is the typical saturation nonlinearity. We investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation with and without consensual incentives respectively. The population always evolves to full defection when the incentives are absent. Cooperation, however, can be promoted by consensual incentives when the degree of cooperators' preferences for incentives is great. There exists an intermediate amount of resources at which the positive effect of consensual incentives on cooperation is minimized. Furthermore, there is a U-shape relationship between the degree of cooperators' preference for an incentive and the evolution of cooperation. A greater basin of full cooperation can be induced when the cooperators' preference for reward is more pronounced than that for punishment.     

Convex functions, subdifferentiability and renormings

This paper through discussing subdifferentiability and convexity of convex functions shows that a Banach space admits an equivalent uniformly [locally uniformly, strictly] convex norm if and only if there exists a continuous uniformly [locally uniformly, strictly] convex function on some nonempty open convex subset of the space and presents some characterizations of super-reflexive Banach spaces. Supported by NSFC     

Carathéodory's method for a class of dynamic games

The method of equivalent variational methods, originally due to Carathéodory for free problems in the calculus of variations is extended to investigate feedback Nash equilibria for a class of n-person differential games. Both the finite-horizon and infinite-horizon cases are considered. Examples are given to illustrate the presented results.     

On the average complexity of 3D-Voronoi diagrams of random points on convex polytopes

It is well known that the complexity, i.e. the number of vertices, edges and faces, of the 3-dimensional Voronoi diagram of n points can be as bad as Θ(n²). It is also known that if the points are chosen Independently Identically Distributed uniformly from a 3-dimensional region such as a cube or sphere, then the expected complexity falls to O(n). In this paper we introduce the problem of analyzing what occurs if the points are chosen from a 2-dimensional region in 3-dimensional space. As an example, we examine the situation when the points are drawn from a Poisson distribution with rate n on the surface of a convex polytope. We prove that, in this case, the expected complexity of the resulting Voronoi diagram is O(n).     

合作联盟资源集成计划一种新方法

合作联盟里，资源集成计划往往是联盟成员群体谈判博弈的结果。本以两人博弈为例，对联盟的资源集成计划给出一个谈判博弈模型，能够较好地模仿和反映合作联盟资源整合计划的制订过程。     

ON THE PRODUCT OF GATEAUX DIFFERENTIABILITY LOCALLY CONVEX SPACES

A locally convex space is said to be a Gateaux differentiability space (GDS)provided every continuous convex function defined on a nonempty convex open subset D of the space is densely Gateaux differentiable in D.This paper shows that the product of a GDS and a family of separable Frechet spaces is a GDS,and that the product of a GDS and an arbitrary locally convex space endowed with the weak topology is a GDS.     

关于Banach空间中凸泛函的广义次梯度不等式

本文在前人^[1,2]的基础之上，以凸泛函的次梯度不等式为工具，将Jensen不等式推广到Banach空间中的凸泛函，导出了Banach空间中的Bochner积分型的广义Jensen不等式，给出其在Banach空间概率论中某些应用，从而推广了文献[3—6]的工作．     

Upper Bounds of the Pursuer Control Based on a Linear-Quadratic Differential Game

Differential game formulations provide an adequate basis for a guidance law synthesis against highly maneuvering targets. This paper deals with a guidance law based on a linear-quadratic differential game formulation. This guidance law has many attractive properties: it is continuous, linear with respect to the state variables, and its gain coefficients can be precalculated offline. Nevertheless, due to the lack of hard control constraints in the formulation, the magnitude of the control can exceed the admissible level imposed by the nature of the problem. In this paper, the upper bound of the interceptor control is obtained depending on the system parameters and the penalty coefficients of the game performance index. It is shown that the interceptor can guarantee an arbitrarily small miss distance without exceeding the control constraints if it has sufficient maneuverability and if the penalty coefficients are chosen properly. By manipulating the penalty coefficients, it is possible to reduce significantly the maneuverability requirements compared to the case of zero interceptor penalty coefficient.     

Dynamic Strategic Pricing and Speed of Diffusion

Defining speed of diffusion as the amount of time it takes to get from one penetration level to a higher one, we introduce a dynamic model in which we study the link between pricing policy, speed of diffusion, and number of competitors in the market. Our analysis shows that, in the case of strategic (oligopolistic) competition, the speed of diffusion has an important influence on the optimal pricing policy. In particular, we find that higher speeds of diffusion create an incentive to strategically interacting firms to lower their prices.     

Factorization of operator valued Lp for 0 ≤ p < 1

In [5], it is proved that a bounded linear operator u, from a Banach space Y into an L_p(S, ν) factors through L_p1 (S, ν) for some p₁ > 1, if Y* is of finite cotype; (S, ν) is a probability space for p = 0, and any measure space for 0 < p < 1. In this paper, we generalize this result to uv, where u : Y → L_p(S, ν) and v : X → Y are linear operators such that v* is of finite Ka?in cotype. This result gives also a new proof of Grothendieck's theorem. (© 2004 WILEY‐VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim)