基于权值编码的组合拍卖竞胜标确定启发式算法研究

针对较大规模组合拍卖竞胜标确定问题(WDP),提出了基于权值编码的竞胜标确定启发式算法.改进了算法编码机制并嵌入基于WDP本质特点的启发式搜索规则,极大地提高了算法进化能力和求解效率.模拟实验结果表明该算法能够在较短时间内求出WDP最优解或满意近似解,为较大规模网上组合拍卖竞胜标确定问题提供了切实可行的求解算法.     

Stability and accuracy functions for a multicriteria Boolean linear programming problem with parameterized principle of optimality “from Condorcet to Pareto”

A multicriteria Boolean programming problem with linear cost functions in which initial coefficients of the cost functions are subject to perturbations is considered. For any optimal alternative, with respect to parameterized principle of optimality “from Condorcet to Pareto”, appropriate measures of the quality are introduced. These measures correspond to the so-called stability and accuracy functions defined earlier for optimal solutions of a generic multicriteria combinatorial optimization problem with Pareto and lexicographic optimality principles. Various properties of such functions are studied and maximum norms of perturbations for which an optimal alternative preserves its optimality are calculated. To illustrate the way how the stability and accuracy functions can be used as efficient tools for post-optimal analysis, an application from the voting theory is considered.     

Regular Twists: Replicating Coulomb’s Wire-Torsion Experiments

I discuss our replication of the wire-torsion experiments that Charles Augustin Coulomb (1736–1806) reported in a session of the Paris Académie des Sciences in 1784. I first explain the nature and purpose of the replication method and then apply it to an analysis of Coulomb’s experiments. I conclude by placing Coulomb’s presentation of his memoir into its specific historical contest.     

Condorcet Winners for Public Goods

In this work, we consider a public facility allocation problem decided through a voting process under the majority rule. A location of the public facility is a majority rule winner if there is no other location in the network where more than half of the voters would have been closer to than the majority rule winner. We develop fast algorithms for interesting cases with nice combinatorial structures. We show that the computing problem and the decision problem in the general case, where the number of public facilities is more than one and is considered part of the input size, are all NP-hard. Finally, we discuss majority rule decision making for related models.     

基于前景理论的混合不确定情景下在线多属性反向拍卖的赢者确定方法

在线反向拍卖在当今的经济社会发展中扮演越来越重要的角色,其主要应用于采购招标领域。而在实际的采购拍卖中有关商品属性和供应商信息等方面常会存在一定程度的不确定性,且这些不确定性的刻画又存在着多种模糊表述形式,这些都将增加采购方的风险预期和竞标供应商赢者确定的难度。为此,本文基于前景理论及模糊集理论,研究了同时存在精确数、区间数、三角模糊数、梯形模糊数和语义模糊术语五种属性描述方式的在线多属性反向拍卖的赢者确定问题,提出了一种更具一般性的混合不确定情景下的在线多属性反向拍卖赢者(中标者)确定方法。最后,通过数值算例和比较分析验证了本文所提方法的合理性与有效性,并通过稳健性分析进一步说明方法的稳定性和适用性。     

基于网上拍卖的共同价值托投标分析

基于信息不对称条件下的共同价值模型,刻画了网上拍卖过程中可能存在的托投标行为,并运用博弈理论结合竞价关系求解了竞标者的赢标概率和最优竞价策略．研究发现,在共同价值模型下,参与竞标的人数与嬴者诅咒的发生存在联系;在最高出价者赢标的概率模型基础上,分别建立了是否存在托投标行为时的竞标者收益模型,并求解了竞标者的均衡竞价策略．     

Multiple voting location and single voting location on trees

We examine voting location problems in which the goal is to place, based on an election amongst the users, a given number of facilities in a graph. The user preference is modeled by shortest path distances in the graph. A Condorcet solution is a set of facilities to which there does not exist an alternative set preferred by a majority of the users. Recent works generalize the model to additive indifference and replaced user majority by γ-proportion.     

On Heuristics for Solving Winner Determination Problem in Combinatorial Auctions

The winner determination problem (WDP) in combinatorial auctions is the problem of, given a finite set of combinatorial bids B, finding a feasible subset B of B with a maximum revenue. WDP is known to be equivalent to the maximum weight set packing problem, and hard to approximate by polynomial time algorithms. This paper proposes three heuristic bid ordering schemes for solving WDP; the first two schemes take into account the number of goods shared by conflicting bids, and the third one is based on a recursive application of such local heuristic functions. We conducted several experiments to evaluate the goodness of the proposed schemes. The result of experiments implies that the first two schemes are particularly effective to improve the performance of the resulting heuristic search procedures. More concretely, they are scalable compared with the conventional linear programming (LP) relaxation based schemes, and could quickly provide an optimum solution under optimization schemes such as the branch-and-bound method. In addition, they exhibit a good anytime performance competitive to the LP-based schemes, although it is sensitive to configurable parameters controlling the strength of contributions of bid conflicts to the resultant bid ordering schemes.     

关于正交设计与均匀设计的比较（Ⅲ）

本文通过平均冒尖性（差值评分λ）和极大最小距离ｄ的比较，继续［１，２」说明正交设计的优化效率在主要方面要比均匀设计更好．另外，举反例表明“分散性带来冒尖性”并不绝对有序．     

Scoring rule and majority agreements for large electorates with arbitrary preferences

This paper examines elections among three candidates when the electorate is large and voters can have any of the 26 nontrivial asymmetric binary relations on the candidates as their preference relations. Comparisons are made between rule-λ rankings based on rank-order ballots and simple majorities based on the preference relations. The rule-λ ranking is the decreasing point total order obtained when 1, λ and 0 points are assigned to the candidates ranked first, second and third on each voter's ballot, with 0 ? λ ? 1.Limit probabilities as the number of voters gets large are computed for events such as ‘the first-ranked rule-λ candidate has a majority over the second-ranked rule-λ candidate’ and ‘the rule-λ winner is the Condorcet candidate, given that there is a Condorcet candidate’. The probabilities are expressed as functions of λ and the distribution of voters over types of preference relations. In general, they are maximized at λ = 1/2 (Borda) and minimized at λ = 0 (plurality) and at λ = 1 for any fixed distribution of voters over preference types. The effects of more indifference and increased intransitivity in voter's preference relations are analyzed when λ is fixed.