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1.
Vivek F. Farias 《Operations Research Letters》2006,34(2):180-190
We consider a problem of allocating limited quantities of M types of resources among N independent activities that evolve over T epochs. In each epoch, we assign to each activity a task which consumes resources, generates utility, and determines the subsequent state of the activity. We study the complexity of, and approximation algorithms for, maximizing average utility. 相似文献
2.
The multilevel generalized assignment problem is a problem of assigning agents to tasks where the agents can perform tasks at more than one efficiency level. A profit is associated with each assignment and the objective of the problem is profit maximization. Two heuristic solution methods are presented for the problem. The heuristics are developed from solution methods for the generalized assignment problem. One method uses a regret minimization approach whilst the other method uses a repair approach on a relaxation of the problem. The heuristics are able to solve moderately large instances of the problem rapidly and effectively. Procedures for deriving an upper bound on the solution of the problem are also described. On larger and harder instances of the problem one heuristic is particularly effective. 相似文献
3.
Josep Maria Izquierdo 《TOP》2006,14(2):375-398
The paper introduces a refinement of the notion of population monotonic allocation scheme, called regular population monotonic
allocation scheme (regularpmas). This refinement is based on economic situations in which players may have to select new partners from a set of potential
players and in which there exist certain capacity constraints. A sufficient condition for the existence of a regularpmas is given. For the class of games with regularpmas, we prove that the core coincides with the Davis and Maschler and the Mas-Colell bargaining sets. 相似文献
4.
Tracing is a method of assigning flows in an electricity network to particular generators and loads, assuming perfect mixing at each node. It can be used to assign costs to transmission users. We show that the resulting allocation is equal to the Shapley value of an equivalent co-operative game. 相似文献
5.
Luca Lambertini Raimondello Orsini 《Central European Journal of Operations Research》2007,15(1):105-117
We reconsider the role of network externalities in a dynamic spatial monopoly where the firm must invest in order to accumulate
capacity, while consumers may have either linear or quadratic preferences. We (1) characterise saddle point equilibria, (2)
prove that the extent of market coverage is increasing in the network effect and (3) unlike the existing static literature
on the same problem, the monopolist may not make introductory price offers. Then, we briefly deal with the socially optimal
solution, showing that, in general, a planner would serve more consumers than a profit-seeking monopolist.
相似文献
6.
Jerry Green 《International Journal of Game Theory》2005,33(2):159-180
This paper presents an axiomatic characterization of a family of solutions to two-player quasi-linear social choice problems. In these problems the players select a single action from a set available to them. They may also transfer money between themselves.The solutions form a one-parameter family, where the parameter is a non-negative number, t.The solutions can be interpreted as follows: Any efficient action can be selected. Based on this action, compute for each player a “best claim for compensation”. A claim for compensation is the difference between the value of an alternative action and the selected efficient action, minus a penalty proportional to the extent to which the alternative action is inefficient. The coefficient of proportionality of this penalty is t. The best claim for compensation for a player is the maximum of this computed claim over all possible alternative actions. The solution, at the parameter value t, is to implement the chosen efficient action and make a monetary transfer equal to the average of these two best claims. The characterization relies on three main axioms. The paper presents and justifies these axioms and compares them to related conditions used in other bargaining contexts. In Nash Bargaining Theory, the axioms analogous to these three are in conflict with each other. In contrast, in the quasi-linear social choice setting of this paper, all three conditions can be satisfied simultaneously.This work was supported by the Division of Research at the Harvard Business School. Thanks are due to the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University for its kind hospitality during the Spring of 2002. I have received helpful advice and comments from Youngsub Chun, Ehud Kalai, Herve Moulin, Al Roth, Ilya Segal, Adam Szeidl, Richard Zeckhauser, and other members of the Theory Seminars at Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Rice and Northwestern. 相似文献
7.
8.
Silvia Lorenzo-Freire José M. Alonso-Meijide Balbina Casas-Méndez Ruud Hendrickx 《European Journal of Operational Research》2007
Calleja et al. [Calleja, P., Borm, P., Hendrickx, R., 2005. Multi-issue allocation situations. European Journal of Operational Research 164, 730–747] introduced multi-issue allocation situations with awards. In this paper, we extend the classical model of cooperative games with transferable utility to the cooperative games with transferable utility and awards. We define a run-to-the-bank rule for cooperative games with transferable utility and awards and characterise it in terms of a property of balanced contributions. We apply our main result to bankruptcy problems and multi-issue allocation situations with awards. 相似文献
9.
This paper proposes a perturbation-based heuristic for the capacitated multisource Weber problem. This procedure is based on an effective use of borderline customers. Several implementations are considered and the two most appropriate are then computationally enhanced by using a reduced neighbourhood when solving the transportation problem. Computational results are presented using data sets from the literature, originally used for the uncapacitated case, with encouraging results. 相似文献
10.
Estimating market shares in each market segment using the information entropy concept 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Sales data of a certain product for the various competitors are usually available at the aggregate level. However these data give no clue to the heterogeneities in the sales pattern across different market segments. Heterogeneities are caused by different purchasing behavior in each market segment; as a purchaser in a segment will be attracted to the attributes of the product most important to that segment. This concept can be formalized via a simple attraction model that utilizes an elasticity measure for each quality or price attribute [G.S. Carpenter, L.G. Cooper, D.M. Hanssens, D.F. Midgley, Modeling asymmetric competition, Marketing Science 7 (4) (1998) 393–412]. Assessment of these elasticities is not difficult since customer response – in each market segment – to perception of quality and price is tracked by most firms [J. Ross, D. Georgoff, A survey of productive and quality issues in manufacturing. The state of the industry, Industrial Management 3 (5) (1991) 22–25]. This paper attempts to formulate a generic framework based on the information entropy concept that utilizes such an attraction model to estimate competitors’ sales in each market segment. 相似文献